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Abstract
Marijuana has a complex legal history in the United States,
and as it becomes more popular with Americans, State legislators
and courts are faced with new questions about the substance’s
legality and regulation. While possession of marijuana in any
amount is federally illegal, the substance is treated quite differently
by the states, with some jurisdictions allowing marijuana
possession for medical treatment and others decriminalizing
possession of small amounts. Some states, like Illinois, have fully
legalized possession of marijuana and created a regulated, taxable
market for its sale. However, a part of marijuana’s legal history is
its use as the justification for a warrantless search. Under the
Fourth Amendment, a search is only reasonable if it is supported by
probable cause. While a warrant is required for most searches, the
Supreme Court adopted an Automobile Exception, allowing police
officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable
cause to believe they will discover evidence. One common
justification for a vehicle search is the officer’s claim that he smelled
marijuana. Some courts have termed this the “Plain Smell
Doctrine” and have upheld warrantless searches based on the smell
of marijuana. However, if marijuana is legal in a specific
jurisdiction, should its smell still justify an officer’s warrantless
search? This Comment explores that question, how courts across
the country, and in Illinois, are treating the smell of marijuana after
legalization, and how these decisions are inconsistent with the
social and economic goals behind legalizing marijuana in the state
of Illinois.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Marijuana: A “Legal” Substance Unlike Any Other
Marijuana’s legal status is a hotly debated political topic in
every jurisdiction of the United States.1 Each state’s law varies on
*Cece White, Juris Doctor, UIC John Marshall Law School, 2020, Public
Defender with the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender. I want to
thank the editing staff for all their hard work, my mom, Casey McCaskill for
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how possession of marijuana is treated, but many states now
penalize people carrying small amounts of marijuana similarly to
how they penalize traffic violations – by writing a ticket.2 Other
states, including Illinois, have legalized possession of certain
amounts of marijuana.3 Regardless, police officers conducting
traffic stops still treat suspected possession of marijuana as if it is
a crime by conducting vehicle searches.4 It is easier to understand
this difference in treatment by picturing a routine traffic stop that
involves another legal, but highly regulated, substance – alcohol.5
Imagine you have just been pulled over for rolling through a
stop sign. You are over 21 years of age and sober, but you have an
unopened bottle of wine in a clear bag in the front seat. The officer
who pulled you over speaks to you for a moment and then asks you
to step out of the car. You are a bit confused. You only failed to come
to a complete stop, a minor traffic violation.6 But now the officer
performs a full search of your car. He goes through your glove box,
your trunk, your front center console, under and around the front
and back seats – all without explanation and certainly without a
warrant.7 Eventually, finding nothing suspicious, he sends you on
believing in me, Samiha Yousuf for inspiring me to become a lawyer, Steve Hall
for his support and all he’s taught me, all of Suite 1424 for demonstrating how
to be a true advocate for your clients, my friends for helping me get through law
school, and my husband, Alex White, for his love, sacrifices, and commitment to
helping me research my topic.
1. See generally Keith Speights, Timeline for Marijuana Legalization in the
United States: How the Dominoes are Falling, MOTLEY FOOL (Sep. 23, 2018),
www.fool.com/investing/2018/09/23/timeline-for-marijuana-legalization-in-theunited.aspx (framing the debate surrounding marijuana legalization through
political and legal shifts concerning marijuana possession within each state
over time).
2. Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and
Legalism's Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 326 (2014). See generally
Marijuana: A Deep Dive, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/
bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/marijuana-deep-dive.aspx (last visited
Mar. 29, 2020) (compiling the laws of each state) [hereinafter Marijuana: A
Deep Dive].
3. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-10 (2020).
4. The majority of United States Appellate Circuits and state courts
currently uphold warrantless vehicle searches justified by a police officer’s
assertion that he detected the smell of marijuana despite changing its legal
status. See, e.g., People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2016) (concluding that
“the odor of marijuana remains relevant to probable cause determinations”
because "a substantial number of other marijuana-related activities remain
unlawful.”). For a full discussion, see infra Section III.B.
5. Alcohol Policy Information System, NAT’L INST. HEALTH,
www.alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (providing a
detailed list of alcohol-related policies in the United States at the federal and
state levels, including laws on underage drinking, transportation of alcohol, and
driving while intoxicated as well as regulations on pricing, taxes, retails sales,
and alcohol control systems).
6. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-904 (2020).
7. “A writing issued by the sovereign, an officer of state, or an administrative
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your way with a ticket for the incomplete stop.
A month later in court, you see a copy of his report. It explains
that he searched your car because you did not stop at a stop sign
and he had seen a bottle of alcohol in your car. This seems odd. It is
illegal to have an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, but you were
carrying alcohol in a legal way – the officer saw an unopened bottle.8
That cannot possibly give the police justification to search your
entire car - or can it?
The answer is no – A police officer does not have the right to
search your car unless he has a reason to suspect criminal conduct.9
Here, the officer saw you roll through a stop sign but that is a civil
violation penalized by writing a ticket.10 A civil violation, on its own,
usually cannot justify the police conducting a full search.11 The
alcohol carried in a legal way does not justify the search either.12
However, when the substance being carried is marijuana, recent
changes to its legal status make it more difficult for courts across
the United States to determine whether the officer was justified in
searching the car.13
The majority of states now treat the act of carrying marijuana,
conduct known as “unlawful possession,” 14 as a civil violation.15
Just like failing to stop at a stop sign, the civil violation of
body, authorizing those to whom it is addressed to perform some act.” Warrant,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2020), www.oed.com/view/
Entry/225837.
8. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502(a) (2020) (explaining that “no driver may
transport, carry, possess, or have any alcoholic liquor within the passenger area
of any motor vehicle upon a highway in [Illinois] except in the original container
and with the seal unbroken.”).
9. People v. Ricketson, 264 N.E.2d 220, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (stating “an
arrest for a traffic violation does not, itself, warrant nor justify a search of the
driver, and portions of his vehicle, unless surrounding circumstances
reasonably indicate that the police may be dealing with more than an ordinary
traffic violation.”).
10. Summary of State Laws, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., (11th ed. 2011), www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811457.pdf.
11. Police may only search a vehicle if it is reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to a crime of arrest will be discovered. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
343 (2009) (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)). In the
case of a traffic violation, there will often be no reasonable basis for a search,
even if the traffic violation results in an arrest, because there is no additional
evidence of the traffic violation within the vehicle. Id. at 343-44 (citing Atwater
v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118
(1998)).
12. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502 (describing the offense of possession of an
open container of alcohol in a vehicle without including any provisions against
possession of a sealed container of alcohol).
13. See infra Section III.
14. Unlawful possession is the crime of possession of a prohibited substance
or item by a person not lawfully allowed to possess it by a license or justification.
Unlawful Possession, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed.,
2012).
15. Marijuana: A Deep Dive, supra note 2.
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marijuana possession is penalized by writing a ticket.16 It is
reasonable to assume that a police officer would respond to one civil
violation in the same manner that they would respond to another.
That would mean that if an officer has reason to believe someone
has marijuana in their car, perhaps because he can smell it, he
would write a ticket but not conduct a search.17 Yet, in most states,
an officer’s claim that he detected a faint odor of marijuana coming
from a vehicle still justifies a warrantless search.18 This is true even
in states where possession of marijuana in certain amounts is not a
violation of civil or criminal law.19
This difference in treatment may be due, in part, to how the
legal status of marijuana has changed significantly throughout the
history of the United States.20 Marijuana has shifted from
unregulated, to criminalized, to decriminalized, to today’s more
complex situation where it is legal in one jurisdiction and illegal in
another.21 While the substance is still federally illegal,22 there is
some indication that this could change,23 meaning another major
shift may be coming soon for marijuana in the United States.24 In
Illinois, a major shift already occurred: as of January 1, 2020,
residents age 21 and over may purchase and possess up to one ounce
16. See Lauren Krisai, Reforming Illinois’ Nonviolent Class 4 Felony
Statutes, ILL. POL’Y 12 (Spring 2016), www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/reformingillinois-nonviolent-class-4-felony-statutes/ (stating that “[d]ecriminalization
would allow law enforcement to issue infractions, similar to how traffic laws are
enforced.”).
17. Id.
18. See discussion infra Section III.B.
19. For example, the Michigan Appellate Court recently upheld a
warrantless vehicle search where probable cause was based on the smell of
marijuana. People v. Anthony, 932 N.W.2d 202, 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019). The
Court explained that the passage of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act
(MMMA) provided “a limited license for qualifying patients to use marijuana,”
but that marijuana use cannot occur in “any public place.” Id. (citing MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.26427(b)(3)(B)(2020)). Thus, when the officer smelled
marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle on a public street, “the
protections of the MMMA did not apply to defendant” and the officers had
probable cause for the search. Id. In so holding, the Court established that the
change to marijuana’s legal status in the state of Michigan did not undermine
precedent establishing that the smell of marijuana provides sufficient probable
cause for a warrantless vehicle search. Id. (citing People v. Kazmierczak, 605
N.E.2d 667 (Mich. 2000)).
20. See generally Logan, supra note 2, at 319 (discussing the history of
marijuana legality and arguing in favor of decriminalization with a focus on
police authority).
21. Id.
22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 844 (2018).
23. Several Marijuana-related Bills Pending in Congress, MARIJUANA POL’Y
PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2020), www.mpp.org/policy/federal/.
24. Ian Stewart & Dean Rocco, Federal Cannabis Legalization May be Closer
Than
You
Think,
LAW360
(July
16,
2018),
www.law360.com
/articles/1063280/federal-cannabis-legalization-may-be-closer-than-you-think.
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of marijuana.25
Returning to the alcohol analogy, “Prohibition”26 provides a
clear example of how laws and attitudes towards intoxicating
substances shift overtime. Until 1933, alcohol was federally banned
just like marijuana.27 Today, less than 100 years later, 67 percent
of Americans drink alcohol at least occasionally.28 Culturally,
alcohol is a part of holiday celebrations and mainstream events like
the Superbowl.29 An adult can possess alcohol, even in a car, as long
as they comply with the law.30 Yet, marijuana, another substance
that can be legally possessed in many jurisdictions, is singled out
for special treatment.31 Shifting attitudes throughout the country
and in Illinois thus pose an interesting query: Should that special
treatment extend to the context of vehicle searches? Should the
mere smell of marijuana still establish probable cause32 when a
police officer wants to search a car?

B. Comment Overview
This Comment explores the history of vehicle searches based
on the smell of marijuana and proposes how Illinois courts should
treat searches given marijuana’s current legal status. Part II will
discuss the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement that a search
or seizure must be executed pursuant to a valid warrant or based
on probable cause. It will explain the exception to that rule in a
vehicle and show how the plain view doctrine led courts to adopt a
plain smell doctrine. It will further detail the changing legal status
of marijuana in the United States and more specifically, in Illinois.
25. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-10 (2020).
26. The period between 1920 and 1933 when restrictions forbidding the law
of the manufacture, sale, or transport of alcohol were in force. Prohibition,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(online
ed.
2020),
www.oed.com/view/Entry/152258.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
28. The Buzz About Alcohol: America’s Views on Booze, BARNA GROUP (Oct.
17, 2017), www.barna.com/research/buzz-alcohol-americas-views-booze/.
29. Phillip Bump, The Days of the Year When Americans are Most Drunk,
Visualized, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/20/the-days-of-the-year-when-americans-are-mostdrunk-visualized/.
30. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502 (describing the offense of possession of an
open container of alcohol in a vehicle without including any provisions against
possession of a sealed container of alcohol).
31. For example, Illinois’ medical marijuana laws forbid a medical cannabis
cardholder from possessing marijuana in a vehicle “except in a sealed, tamperevident medical cannabis container” whereas Illinois’ open container alcohol
statute required only that alcohol be “in the original container and with the seal
unbroken.” Compare 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502.1(b), (c) (2020), with 625
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502(a).
32. Probable cause is a practical, non-technical showing of a likelihood that
incriminating evidence is involved. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
For a discussion on probable cause see discussion infra Section II.C.
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Part III will compare the rationale for and against holding that
the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause for a search. It
will address Illinois precedent establishing that an officer can
search a vehicle pursuant to the smell of marijuana, and it will
analyze the post-legalization holding of the Illinois Supreme Court
in People v. Hill.33 Finally, this Comment will propose that Illinois
should change its position to better reflect the current legal status
of marijuana, the state’s legislative and economic goals, and the
future towards which the United States appears to be heading.

II. BACKGROUND
Prior to analyzing the current treatment of marijuana
possession in the context of vehicle searches, one must understand
the history that led courts to find that some warrantless searches
were permissible. Accordingly, this Comment first explains shifting
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and the resulting
warrant exceptions for vehicle searches and items in plain view.
Next, it discusses how plain view doctrine has been extended by
some courts to cover other senses, specifically smell. Finally, this
section addresses the history and latest changes to the legal status
of marijuana in the United States and in Illinois.

A. The Fourth Amendment & Expectations of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment protects a citizen’s right “to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”34 The guarantee of these words today often
functions as a limit on the power of the police,35 but there were no
organized police forces at the time of the Amendment’s drafting.36
33. People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
35. This limit on the power of the police is accomplished through the
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule functions to suppress evidence that
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. While the rule itself is not
in the text of the amendment, cases have suggested that without exclusion, the
Fourth Amendment is an empty promise. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (explaining that the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are
secured through an exclusionary rule).
36. Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NAT’L CONST.
CTR.,
www.constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/amendment-iv/interps/121(last accessed Apr. 24,
2020).
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Instead, the Framers included the Fourth Amendment to limit their
new government from adopting a system of unfettered power like
that of England’s use of general warrants and writs of assistance.37
In England, warrants did not require a showing of a specific cause
for a search or any proof of criminal wrongdoing.38 Thus, their use
provided those in power a mechanism to enter the homes of political
enemies and citizens who failed to pay taxes.39 With this abuse of
power in mind, the Framers’ purpose for the Fourth Amendment
was “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”40
There is a debate among scholars41 and U.S. Supreme Court
Justices as to whether a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment must be pursuant to a warrant or whether it must
simply be reasonable.42 While this debate is far from settled, the
Supreme Court majority has generally agreed with a warrantpreference interpretation.43 This means that when time and
circumstances allow, a warrant, supported by probable cause,44
must be approved by a neutral magistrate before a search or seizure
can be conducted.45 While there are exceptions,46 a search or seizure
37. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 561 (1999). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth
Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 7780 (1996) (analyzing the differences between writs of assistance and general
warrants).
38. Id. at 561 (citing Nelson B. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937)).
39. Freidman & Kerr, supra note 36.
40. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
41. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1997) (first quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969) (“[O]ur constitutional
fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching
warrants.”); then discussing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 410-15 (1974) (rejecting Telford Taylor's
argument that the Fourth Amendment requires only that warrantless searches
be judged under a general reasonableness standard)).
42. Id. (comparing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (reading the text of the Fourth Amendment to limit, rather than
to require, warrants) with Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)
(“Unreasonable searches and seizures conducted without any warrant at all are
condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment.”)).
43. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 351, 357 (1967) (citing Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.471,
481-82 (1963); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (stating that the
general rule, outside of “well-delineated exceptions” is that a warrant is
required for a search)).
44. “Probable cause is a practical, non-technical” showing of a likelihood that
incriminating evidence is involved. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949). For a discussion on probable cause, see discussion infra Section II.C.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
46. One such exception is the automobile exception. See discussion infra
Section II.B. Another exception is exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Kentucky v.
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conducted without a warrant is per se47 unreasonable.48
This warrant preference rule, and the Fourth Amendment
itself, is only implicated if there is conduct qualifying as a search or
seizure.49 As to searches,50 the Supreme Court has defined what
qualifies as a search differently throughout its history.51 At first,
the concept of a search was tied directly to the idea of property and
trespass.52 A search required some sort of physical entry onto an
individual’s property.53 For example, in Olmstead v. United States,
police in the 1920s tapped a phone line outside of a suspect’s home
to intercept his calls.54 The Court in Olmstead held that the
government did not trespass; rather, the act of placing the tap took
place on public property.55 Under the Court’s precedent at that time,
police activity on public property was not a search.56 The Fourth
Amendment was not implicated, let alone violated.57
This sole focus on property and trespass proved untenable in a
1967 case, Katz v. United States.58 In Katz, the police installed a
listening device on a public phone booth and recorded the suspect’s
conversations, eventually using that evidence to convict him.59
Following the example of Olmstead, the Ninth Circuit Court of
King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (holding no warrant is required to enter a home to
stop destruction of evidence).
47. “Per se, Latin for in itself, depicts something generalized, something
considered in its most essential and generic character, without considering
irrelevant or idiosyncratic descriptions.” Per se, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER
LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed., 2012).
48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
49. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-79 (1984) (discussing
whether a person has privacy expectations in the context of open fields with a
focus on the historical underpinnings of when the Fourth Amendment is
implicated).
50. The validity of a seizure in the context of automobile stops is a complex
topic outside the scope of this comment, which will focus primarily on searches.
For more information on seizures, see Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63
(1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)) (stating “A
‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 436 (1991) (explaining that an individual can also be seized, such as in an
arrest or custodial interrogation, which is measured by “whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter”).
51. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding
that a trespass is required for conduct to qualify as a search), with Katz, 389
U.S. at 357 (shifting the analysis of whether conduct qualifies as a search to
societal expectations of privacy).
52. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 456-57.
55. Id. at 466.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
59. Id. at 348.
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Appeals held there was no search because the act of installing a
listening device did not take place on the suspect’s property but on
a public sidewalk.60
The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether a
trespass or “physical penetration of a constitutionally protected
area is necessary” to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.61 The
Supreme Court declined to adopt that position and instead
reversed, holding that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”62 In a major shift from its previous holdings, the Court
stated that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”63
Instead of relying on trespass to property, the Court examined (1)
whether the suspect had an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
that expectation was objectively reasonable.64 The Court
determined that one who enters the phone booth, “shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”65 It is not
unreasonable to expect privacy in a society where telephonic
communication is prevalent.66
After Katz, the legality of a search typically revolves around
this determination of whether a person had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the object of the police’s search.67
Expectations shift depending on the facts of a case with location
being determinative in some instances.68 A person inside of her own
home has a high expectation of privacy that the Fourth Amendment
will vehemently protect, but a person outside of her home, perhaps
on a public sidewalk, has a much lower expectation of privacy.69
This shift not only expanded what qualifies as a search but also
helped define the “reasonableness” of a search when it is not
pursuant to a warrant.70 The lower the expectation of privacy, the

60. Id. at 348-49.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (stating that while
Katz expanded the definition of a search, the previous trespass model is still
good law).
68. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (describing the “firm line” that cannot
be crossed without a warrant at the entrance of the home for Fourth
Amendment purposes); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that
using technology to see inside of a house is the same as entering the house and
the home is vehemently protected by the Fourth Amendment).
69. Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
70. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013) (describing that the scope
of reasonableness is defined by expectations of privacy).
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more reasonable the warrantless search becomes.71 This reasoning
led the Supreme Court to adopt exceptions to its warrant
preference, two of which help explain why the odor of marijuana
may justify a warrantless search: the automobile exception72 and
the plain view doctrine.73

B. The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
Warrant Preference
The automobile exception to the general warrant requirement
reflects the Court’s shift to analyzing expectations of privacy and
the Fourth Amendment’s most basic mandate of reasonableness.74
This exception, first established in Carroll v. United States75 is often
referred to as the Carroll doctrine.76 In Carroll, the Court held that
a police officer was entitled to search a vehicle without a warrant
where there was probable cause to believe the vehicle was being
used to transport liquor during Prohibition.77 The Court described
that such an exception arose from the practical difference between
searching a house and searching an automobile.78 A vehicle can be
readily and quickly moved outside of the jurisdiction before a police
officer can practically apply for and obtain a warrant.79
This focus on mobility gave rise to the exception, but when the
Court’s Fourth Amendment interpretation shifted towards
expectations of privacy, there was even stronger support for the
automobile exception.80 A vehicle is driven on public roads in plain
view81 and subject to extensive government regulation such as

71. Id.
72. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
73. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
74. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (stating, “the guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been
construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”).
75. Id. at 132.
76. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982) (explaining “we held that a warrantless search of an automobile
under the Carroll doctrine could include a search of a container or package
found inside the car when such a search was supported by probable cause.”)).
77. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
78. Id. at 153.
79. Id.
80. See generally Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (reexamining the
automobile exception after the ruling in Katz).
81. Id. at 440.

198

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:187

license plating and periodic safety checks.82 A person driving a
vehicle cannot reasonably expect a high level of privacy while in
public in an object that is already subject to government
inspection.83 Due to this lower expectation of privacy combined with
the practical limits of obtaining a warrant described in Carroll,
there is an accepted rule that a warrant is not required for a vehicle
search.84

C. Probable Cause in the Context of an Automobile
It is important to note that while the automobile exception
means that officers do not need a warrant to search a vehicle, an
officer must still have probable cause.85 Probable cause is a
practical, non-technical showing of a likelihood that incriminating
evidence is involved.86 It is an officer’s belief in guilt of a crime from
facts and inferences that are particularly focused on the person or
place to be searched.87 An officer must always have probable cause
to conduct a search, even if the officer is not required to have a
warrant.88
The difference between warrantless searches and those
conducted pursuant to a warrant is in when and by whom probable
cause is determined.89 In the warrant context, the officer must
demonstrate probable cause to a judge prior to the search.90 An
officer provides the judge with an affidavit describing the facts in
support of probable cause.91 The judge reviews the warrant
application and, if the judge agrees that there is probable cause, the
warrant is signed, allowing the search.92
In the warrantless context, “the prior approval of the
magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the

82. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
83. The Court’s decision in Katz, created the principle that expectations of
privacy are based on societal standards and are determined by objective
reasonableness of how private a location is or should remain. Katz, 389 U.S. 351
(1967) applied to motor vehicles because drivers are aware that they can be seen
and are aware that their cars are subject to inspection. Thus, a driver believing
they had a high expectation of privacy would be unreasonable.
84. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
85. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at
823 (1982) (“Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, only the
prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such]
as the magistrate could authorize.”)).
86. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
87. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371.
88. Ross, U.S. at 823.
89. Id. at 825 (“[T]he scope of a warrantless search . . . is no broader and no
narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant.”).
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
91. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(d)(2)(A).
92. Id. at 41(f).
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magistrate could authorize.”93 In practice, the officer determines in
the moment whether there is probable cause to search,94 but the
evidence he finds will be suppressed if a judge later determines that
he did not have sufficient probable cause.95 If this system works
correctly, probable cause is still required for a warrantless search,
it is simply “approved” by the court after the fact.96
Likewise, regardless of whether an officer has a warrant, the
permissible scope of the search is limited by probable cause. The
scope of the search is “defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found.”97 For example, probable cause to believe that a stolen
lawnmower may be found in a garage does not justify a search of
the upstairs bedroom. This is just as true in the context of a
vehicle.98 Probable cause to believe that a suitcase in the trunk
contains drugs does not justify a search of the entire car.99 In short,
an officer may not have to obtain a warrant prior to searching a
vehicle, but he must still have particularized probable cause that
justifies the search and he must be able to demonstrate that after
the fact.100

D. Plain View Doctrine & its Extension into Plain Smell
Doctrine
While the automobile exception begins to explain how courts
came to see the odor of marijuana as probable cause to search a
vehicle, plain view doctrine and its evolution into “plain smell”
doctrine is essential to the analysis.101 Under plain view doctrine,
an officer, in a place where he is lawfully entitled to be,102 may seize
an object in sight if it is immediately apparent that the object is

93. Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 823).
94. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (citing United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975)).
95. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 478.
96. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
97. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
98. The Supreme Court briefly found certain containers within a car more
“worthy” of Fourth Amendment protection but later dropped that distinction.
See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding that luggage is more
worthy of Fourth Amendment protection than other containers in a vehicle
context).
99. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
100. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
101. Michael A. Sprow, Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts
That Do Not Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 289, 295 (2000) [hereinafter Sprow, Wake Up].
102. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465 (creating the rule that for the plain view
doctrine to apply, the police must legally be entitled to be in the location, due to
a warrant or warrant exception).
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incriminating.103 For example, an officer executing a search
warrant for drugs can seize stolen televisions that he sees in the
same location if he has probable cause to believe they had been
stolen.104 This doctrine is about seizure; the officer can take the
specific item, not perform an additional search outside of his
warrant because he has seen it in plain view.105
In contrast, plain view doctrine in the vehicle context does
allow that additional search.106 If an officer sees an item in an
automobile that he knows is incriminating on sight, such as a bag
containing white powder, he can seize it.107 Based on what the
officer saw, he also now has probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains more contraband.108 Probable cause is all he needs to
justify a search under the automobile exception.109 The
incriminating item in plain view provided him probable cause.110
Thus, he can conduct a search of the vehicle.111
The basic rationale behind plain view is that an officer can rely
on his senses and training.112 As the U.S. Supreme Court described,
when “the police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it
would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous
-- to the evidence or to the police themselves -- to require them to
ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing
it.”113 This rationale can easily be applied to an officer’s other
senses,114 which has led courts to expand plain view into “plain
smell doctrine.”115 Following the model of plain view,116 plain smell
doctrine’s basic rule is that an officer, in a place where he is lawfully
entitled to be, may seize an object that he smells if it is immediately

103. Id.
104. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
105. Reuben Goetzl, Common Scents: The Intersection of the “Plain Smell”
and “Common Enterprise” Doctrines, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 607, 611 (2013)
(citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443) [hereinafter Goetzl, Common Scents].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 613.
109. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
110. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.
111. Goetzl, Common Scents, supra note 105, at 612 (stating “The Supreme
Court of Ohio explained that since ‘courts already acknowledge the use of a
person's senses - sight, touch, hearing - to identify contraband . . . [there] is no
reason to afford less weight to one's use of the sense of smell . . . when looking
to probabilities.’”).
112. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (explaining that under
plain view doctrine, the officer need not rely on any “special operational
necessities” such as a trained drug-sniffing dog, but rather “the mere fact that
the items in question came lawfully within the officer’s pain view”).
113. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
114. Sprow, Wake Up, supra note 101, at 295.
115. See United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding
“[t]he odor of marijuana places it in plain view”).
116. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
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apparent from the scent that the object is incriminating.117 The
difference is that in order to seize the object, he must find it first so
he can search for the object that he smells.118
In an automobile context, an officer smells contraband coming
from the car. Pursuant to plain smell doctrine, he now has probable
cause to believe there is contraband in the vehicle.119 Probable cause
gives grounds for a warrantless search of the vehicle.120 Just as an
officer who sees what he knows to be contraband can search for
more, an officer who smells what he knows to be contraband can do
the same.121
The U.S. Supreme Court has not formally adopted plain smell
doctrine.122 Despite its reluctance, many lower federal courts and
state courts have explicitly adopted it.123 While these courts have
applied plain smell in cases involving other substances, like burning
opium,124 the smell of marijuana is its most common application.125
These courts rely on the combined reasoning of a lower expectation
of privacy, leading to the automobile exception, and plain view
doctrine, leading to plain smell doctrine, to find the odor of
marijuana provides sufficient probable cause to support a vehicle
117. Goetzl, Common Scents, supra note 105, at 611 (stating “an officer can
seize evidence if he lawfully smells contraband, he immediately recognizes the
smell's source as an illegal object, and he has a lawful right to access the object.
The ‘plain smell’ doctrine is as expansive as the ‘plain view’ doctrine and can
create probable cause to search people and places and arrest suspects.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
121. Mayfield v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W. 3d 300, 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019)
(quoting Sprow, Wake Up, supra note 101, at 308-309) (“This court recognizes
the constitutional analogue between the ‘plain small’ ‘plain feel’ and ‘plain view’
doctrines . . . because ‘any attempt to create a hierarchy of senses under the
Fourth Amendment probable cause standard defies common sense and
unjustifiably hinders effective law enforcement.’”).
122. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (holding that the smell
of whiskey is not enough for probable cause in prohibition era, but other scents
may be); and United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (implying that scent
of marijuana may be enough for probable cause but having other facts to rely
on to decide the present case).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 684 F. App'x 531, 535-36 (6th Cir.
2017) (holding an officer's detection of the smell of marijuana in the vehicle
context establishes probable cause for a search, even without other facts in
support); and United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding the odor of burnt marijuana is sufficient probable cause to search an
entire vehicle).
124. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
125. Andrea L. Ben–Yosef, Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Search of
Motor Vehicle Based on Odor of Marijuana–State Cases, 114 A.L.R.5th 173, 189
(2003) (“The majority of [state] courts have found that the odor of marijuana
alone supplies the probable cause for a warrantless search.”). See also Andrea
L. Ben–Yosef, Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Search of Motor Vehicle
Based on Odor of Marijuana–Federal Cases, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 487, 497 (2003)
(collecting federal cases on the same issue).
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search.126

E. The Changing Legal Status of Marijuana
Considering one necessary inference to the rationale behind
plain smell doctrine is that the odor of marijuana is indicative of
criminal activity, the current legal status of marijuana is important
to consider.127 The laws regulating marijuana in the United States
have shifted throughout its history.128 Marijuana was unregulated
in the states until 1915 when possession was first criminalized in
Utah.129 By 1931, 22 states had statutes criminalizing possession.130
By 1950, all 50 states had made possession of marijuana a crime.131
In 1970, the federal government criminalized possession at the
national level when it passed the Controlled Substances Act.132 As
the war on drugs continued in the 1970s and 1980s, arrests and
incarcerations as a result of marijuana possession rose
exponentially, despite the drug’s recreational popularity.133
The first state to decriminalize marijuana possession was
Oregon in 1973,134 but a major shift among the states towards
decriminalizing did not occur until the early 2000s.135 Motivated by
shifts in popular opinion, as well as economic and political
pressures, states slowly began to relax the penalties associated with
possession of marijuana over the last two decades.136 Today, the
laws regulating marijuana in the United States can be grouped into
four categories: (1) prohibition; (2) decriminalization; (3) medical;

126. See e.g., People v. Stout, 477 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. 1985) (holding
marijuana odor is indicative of criminal activity and due to the lowered
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and the impracticality of obtaining a warrant
before the vehicle could be moved, is enough to establish sufficient probable
cause for a warrantless search of the vehicle).
127. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011) (concluding
“suspicion of an offense” in the probable cause or reasonable articulable
suspicion analysis means an offense that is criminal).
128. Logan, supra note 2, at 323-27.
129. Id. at 323 (citing Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The
Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History
of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1010 (1970).
130. Id. (citing MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
MARIJUANA - MEDICAL, RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 24-26 (2012)).
131. Id. (citing Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 129, at 1034).
132. See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236-1285 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C.§§ 812-844 (2018)).
133. Logan, supra note 2, at 323-34 (citing James A. Inciardi, Marijuana
Decriminalization Research, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 151 (1981)).
134. Id. at 324-25 (citing James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the
United States: History and Analysis of a Failed Policy, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 417, 425 (1988)).
135. Id. at 325-26.
136. Id.
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and (4) legalization.137
Prohibition laws define any conduct related to marijuana as a
criminal offense, including possession in any amount, cultivation,
or sale.138 These state laws may penalize possession of marijuana
differently depending on the amount that a person possesses, but
whether a misdemeanor or felony, possession in prohibition
jurisdictions is always a criminal offense.139 For example, United
States Federal Law is a prohibition law.140 Marijuana is a Schedule
I drug under the Controlled Substances Act.141 Schedule I is the
most tightly restricted category in the Act and is defined as a drug
or substance with "a high potential for abuse” that “has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States” and for
which “there is a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision.”142 At the federal level, possession of marijuana in any
amount is a criminal offense.143
Decriminalization refers to those laws that have eliminated
the criminal status associated with marijuana possession to some
degree.144 The term is typically used to describe two different
categories of state law.145 First, some state laws that have
“decriminalized” marijuana have more accurately “de-penalized” in
that possession of a small amount of marijuana is punishable by a
fine, but the statute still defines it as a criminal offense.146 For
example, Missouri law defines first offense possession of up to 10
grams of marijuana as a misdemeanor, subject to a maximum fine
of 500 dollars with no possibility of incarceration.147 The second
category is state laws that have entirely removed criminal penalties
associated with marijuana possession, opting instead to define it as
a civil offense.148 For example, Maryland law defines possession of
10 grams or less of marijuana as a civil offense subject to a fine of
up to 100 dollars.149 Even those states that would more accurately
be described as “de-penalized,” treat possession of marijuana more
137. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Rosanna Smart, Medical Marijuana and
Marijuana Legalization, 13 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 397-419, 400 (2017),
www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032816-045128.
138. Id.
139. For example, Wisconsin is a state with prohibition laws in which
possession of any amount is a misdemeanor subject to 6 months’ incarceration
and a fine of 1,000 dollars and in which there is law allowing medical use of
marijuana. WIS. STAT. §§ 961.14, 961.41(3g) (2019).
140. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 844 (2020).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(I)(c)(10) (2020).
142. Id. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2020).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2020).
144. Pacula & Smart, supra note 137, at 400.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. MO. REV. STAT. § 579.015 (2020).
148. Pacula & Smart, supra note 137, at 400.
149. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §5-601(a), (c)(2)(ii) (2020).

204

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:187

like a minor traffic violation for a first time offender in that the
police officer typically issues a citation.150 While state laws that
define marijuana possession as a criminal offense carry personal
consequences for those convicted,151 it is useful for the limited
purpose of this comment to group both types of state law under the
category “decriminalization.”
Medical marijuana laws remove any penalty, civil or criminal,
for possession of marijuana for state-approved medicinal
purposes.152 States that have laws allowing medical marijuana
typically require a doctor to certify that a person has one of the
qualifying conditions listed in the statute and typically define where
a person may obtain marijuana and in what quantity.153 For
example, in the state of Arizona, a person whose doctor has
diagnosed a serious medical condition, such as Alzheimer’s Disease,
Cancer, or Glaucoma, may possess 2.5 ounces of marijuana and may
purchase it at a state-licensed dispensary or may cultivate it
themselves at home.154
Finally, legalization refers to those laws that have removed
any penalty, civil or criminal, for possession of certain amounts of
marijuana for adult recreational use, regardless of medical need.155
Colorado and Washington led the charge on legalization when they
both passed ballot initiatives in 2012 removing penalties for
marijuana possession and creating a taxed retail market for the sale
of marijuana in each state.156 For example, the state of Washington
has legalized possession of certain amounts of marijuana
entirely.157 An adult over the age of 21 can purchase up to one ounce
of marijuana, a little more than 28 grams.158 Therefore, a police
officer who searched a vehicle in Washington and found 28 grams
of marijuana would likely allow the driver to leave without any sort
of penalty.159
Today, there are 13 states that have prohibition laws making

150. Missouri: Sentencing Reform Measure Reduces Marijuana Possession
Penalties, NORML (May 8, 2014), www.norml.org/news/2014/05/08/missourisentencing-reform-measure-reduces-marijuana-possession-penalties.
151. Pacula & Smart, supra note 137, at 400.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 400-01.
154. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2801(1)(a)(i), (3)(a) (2020).
155. Pacula & Smart, supra note 137, at 401.
156. Id.
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.360 (2020) (removing all criminal penalties
for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana).
158. Id. § (3)(a) (2020).
159. This statement assumes that the vehicle’s occupant is over the age of
21 and has purchased the marijuana for personal consumption. It is still a
felony within the state to distribute marijuana and a misdemeanor to possess
marijuana if under the age of 21. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 (2015); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.401 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.430 (2015);
WASH, REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 (2015).
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possession of marijuana in any amount a criminal offense.160 The
other categories of law typically overlap, with many states adopting
laws for both medical marijuana and decriminalization.161 In total,
27 states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized, 33
states and the District of Columbia have medical marijuana laws,
and 11 states and the District of Columbia have legalized.162
However, these numbers are expected to shift over the next year as
there are currently 22 states considering bills for legalization, 13
states considering bills for decriminalization, and 12 states
considering bills for medical marijuana.163
While legalization is taking place at the state level, there are
indications that the Federal Government no longer prioritizes
marijuana as it once did. In response to legalization in Colorado and
Washington, the Department of Justice announced in 2013 that it
would not expend resources on prosecution or challenge the passage
of legalization laws at the state level.164 However, that position was
officially rescinded in 2018 by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, but
he did not call for federal prosecutors to take any specific action.165
When Attorney General William Barr was confirmed as Sessions’
replacement, he pledged to the Senate that he would not “go after”
marijuana businesses acting in compliance with state law.166
Marijuana remains classified as a Schedule I drug under the
Controlled Substances Act, but the Federal Government has
created an exemption for “certain cannabis plant material,”167 in
160. Map of Marijuana Legality by State, DISA (last updated Apr. 2020),
www.disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state. Some of these states do
allow other cannabinoids, such as CBD oil. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 2020 Marijuana Policy Reform Legislation, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT
(March 19, 2020), www.mpp.org/issues/legislation/key-marijuana-policyreform/.
164 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to All United
States Attorneys: Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013).
165. Memorandum from Jeffrey Sessions, Att’y Gen., to All United States
Attorneys Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018).
166. Tom Angell, Trump Attorney General Pick Puts Marijuana Enforcement
Pledge
in
Writing,
FORBES
(Jan.
28,
2019),
www.forbes.com/
sites/tomangell/2019/01/28/trump-attorney-general-pick-puts-marijuanaenforcement-pledge-in-writing/#753593e65435.
167. For example, the FDA has approved Epidolex, a drug with an active
ingredient that is derived from the same family of plants as marijuana. FDA
Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-Derived Products, Including
Cannabidiol (CBD), FDA, www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fdaregulation-cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-products-including-cannabidiol-cbd
(last updated Mar. 11, 2020). Marijuana is derived from cannabis, a plant that
“contains more than eighty biologically active chemical compounds.” Id. The
most common chemical compounds are delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
and cannabidiol (CBD). Id. THC has psychoactive effects and remains a
prohibited substance, but “a purified form” of CBD is the active ingredient in
Epidolex, which is FDA- approved for the treatment of seizures. Id.
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recognition of the plant’s overall potential for medical treatment.168
Further, there are several marijuana reform bills currently pending
in Congress,169 including an Act that would federally decriminalize
marijuana and remove it from the Controlled Substances Act.170
1. Marijuana Legalization in Illinois
Illinois legislators passed medical marijuana laws in 2013
allowing those with certain qualifying illnesses171 to purchase and
possess172 marijuana. In 2017, Illinois law decriminalized
marijuana making possession of 10 grams or less a civil violation
akin to a traffic ticket.173 Under decriminalization, only those
possessing quantities of marijuana that implicated distribution
were subject to the harsh penalties that were once the norm.174 As
of January 1, 2020, Illinois became the eleventh state to legalize
marijuana for recreational adult use.175 Today, an adult can
purchase and possess up to 30 grams of marijuana without facing
any penalty.176
Whatever the outcome of upcoming legislation at the state and
federal levels, it is undeniable that marijuana possession is not
policed with the veracity it once was. As states decriminalize or
legalize, their courts are grappling with new challenges to the
automobile exception, plain view doctrine, and plain smell doctrine.
As the next section will further detail, one major question facing
courts today is how this change in law affects the validity of an
officer’s warrantless vehicle search based on probable cause
justified by the smell of marijuana.

168. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.35 (2020).
169. Several Marijuana-related Bills Pending in Congress, MARIJUANA
POL’Y PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2020), www.mpp.org/policy/federal/.
170. Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019,
116 H.R. 3884, 116 S. 2227 (2019) (as reported to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary),
and Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019, 116
S. 2227 (2019) (as reported to S. Comm. on Fin.).
171. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/5 (a) (2018) (stating “[m]odern medical
research has confirmed the beneficial uses of cannabis in treating or alleviating
the pain, nausea, and other symptoms associated with a variety of debilitating
medical conditions, including cancer, multiple sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS, as
found by the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in March
1999”).
172. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/25 (2020).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. German Lopez, Illinois Just Legalized Marijuana, VOX (Jun. 25, 2019),
www.vox.com/2019/6/25/18650478/illinois-marijuana-legalization-governor-jbpritzker.
176. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-10.
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III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze two opposing rationales employed by
courts in decriminalized and legalized jurisdictions cases where the
smell of marijuana was the justification for a warrantless vehicle
search. Some courts elect to follow pre-decriminalization precedent
by holding that the smell of marijuana provides sufficient grounds
to establish probable cause, despite its change in legal status.177 On
the other hand, some courts are overturning such precedent by
finding that changing the legal status of marijuana necessarily
changes the probable cause analysis.178
This section will next analyze Illinois’ pre-legalization
treatment of the odor of marijuana and how the state’s highest court
changed its position throughout the 1980s. Next, this section will
discuss the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Hill,179 a
case ruled on after Illinois legalized possession of marijuana. While
the Illinois Supreme Court failed to definitively provide an answer
on the issue of marijuana odor and probable cause, Hill suggests
that in at least the vehicle context, the odor of marijuana shall
remain sufficient to establish probable cause in the state of
Illinois.180
Finally, this section will argue that it is a mistake for courts in
Illinois to continue to find that the smell of marijuana, on its own,
provides an officer probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search.
Such a policy depends on an unfounded belief that a police officer
can reliably detect the odor of marijuana and contradicts the goals
behind legalization. This section argues that by refusing to reject
such a policy, the state court system is frustrating the legislation’s
social and economic goals – the key reasons why legalization passed
in Illinois.

A. Courts Split into Two Debating Groups After
Decriminalization
As more states alter marijuana’s legal status, their criminal
courts must determine how to analyze warrantless searches later
177. This is the majority position. See e.g., Robinson v. State, 152 A.3d 661,
681 (Md. 2017) (stating that because a recent amendment decriminalized, but
did not legalize marijuana possession in small amounts, the smell of marijuana
still constitutes sufficient probable cause).
178. See Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (explaining that that when possession is a
civil violation, the odor of burnt marijuana alone cannot provide suspicion of
criminal activity); Id. at 913 (stating that “no facts were articulated to support
probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband was present in
the car.”).
179. Hill, 2020 IL 124595.
180. Id. ¶ 18 n.2.
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justified by an officer’s claim of smelling marijuana. Prior to relaxed
marijuana regulation, the automobile exception,181 plain view
doctrine, and its extension into plain smell doctrine182 worked
together to justify warrantless vehicle searches. However, it is
harder to rationalize that same position when the odor of marijuana
could exist for completely legal reasons.183 Out of this tension, state
courts and federal jurisdictions applying state law have split into
two groups employing different rationales to solve this legal
problem.184 Many courts in states that have decriminalized or
legalized marijuana still maintain that the smell of marijuana is
sufficient to establish probable cause justifying warrantless
searches in the vehicle context.185 Others take the position that the
smell of marijuana cannot alone justify such searches where
possession of marijuana has been decriminalized or legalized.186
1. Courts in Favor of the Smell of Marijuana Establishing
Probable Cause Despite its Change in Legal Status
There are courts that continue to uphold warrantless searches
based on the smell of marijuana in jurisdictions that have

181. See discussion supra Section II.B.
182. See discussion supra Section II.D.
183. For example, it is legal to possess a sealed bag of marijuana in a vehicle
in Illinois and thus, the smell could emanate from a car during a traffic stop
despite the driver complying with law. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/30(2)(E)
(2019) (stating a person cannot possess cannabis in a vehicle unless “in a
reasonably secured, sealed container and reasonably inaccessible while the
vehicle is moving”).
184. There is a circuit split on the issue of marijuana odor and probable
cause. See generally Bernie Pazanowski, Marijuana-Based Car Search Still Up
in the Air in Fourth Circuit, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 12, 2018), www.biglawbusin
ess.com/marijuana-based-car-search-still-up-in-the-air-in-fourth-circuit
(discussing how circuits have ruled on the issue compared to the Fourth
Circuit). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that the odor of marijuana
does constitute probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search, even if it is the
only fact in support of probable cause. See, e.g., Winters, 221 F.3d at 1041
(holding that the odor of burnt marijuana constitutes sufficient probable cause
for the whole vehicle, including the trunk); United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d
684, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the smell of marijuana provides
probable cause to search any part of the car, refusing to adopt a bright line rule).
The Tenth Circuit has distinguished between the type of marijuana odor – raw
or burnt – to determine whether an officer has probable cause to search a
vehicle’s main cabin, where marijuana could be burning, or search a vehicle’s
trunk, where it would presumably be raw. United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d
1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit has not expressly ruled on the
issue finding in a recent case that the smell of marijuana was only one factor
and, because it was supported by other indications of suspicion, the court did
not need to determine if it would have been enough on its own. United States v.
Pankey, 710 F. App'x 615, 616-17 (4th Cir. 2018).
185. See infra Section III.B.1.
186. See infra Section III.B.2.
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decriminalized and legalized.187 Courts in decriminalized
jurisdictions that continue to find the smell of marijuana sufficient
to establish probable cause, despite decriminalization, have focused
on the exact meaning of “decriminalizing,” instead of “legalizing.”188
As explained in Part II, decriminalizing involves modifying the
penalty for possession of marijuana, either by changing possession
from a criminal violation to a civil violation or by opting to penalize
possession with a fine instead of incarceration.189As such,
decriminalizing does not “legalize” possession of marijuana; it
merely removes the severe penalties associated with criminal
conduct.190 For example, in the state of Maryland, possession of less
than 10 grams of marijuana is defined as a civil offense, but
possession is nonetheless still technically illegal.191
This difference is easiest to understand by returning to the
comparison to traffic violations. Just as it is still illegal to possess
any amount of marijuana in Maryland, it is illegal to drive at any
speed over the posted speed limit.192 Despite this, driving 10 miles
over the posted speed limit is a civil violation, while driving 30 miles
over the posted speed limit is a criminal violation.193 In Maryland,
a police officer who has observed someone speeding 10 miles per
hour over the limit is likely to give them a ticket and send them on
their way.194 A police officer who has searched a vehicle and found
no more than 10 grams of marijuana is similarly likely to give them
187. People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2016).
188. See, e.g., Robinson, 152 A.3d at 681 (stating that a recent amendment
decriminalized but did not legalize marijuana possession in small amounts);
Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1060 (concluding that “the odor of marijuana remains
relevant to probable cause determinations” because "a substantial number of
other marijuana-related activities remain unlawful.”).
189. See Jordan B. Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine
Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 677 (2015) (quoting DAVID E. AARONSON,
C. THOMAS DIENES & MICHAEL C. MUSHENO, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICE
DISCRETION: PROCESSES OF DECRIMINALIZATION 153, 153 (1984) (defining
decriminalization as “removing criminal sanctions attached to particular
behavior” and providing a nuanced discussion on the differences between
decriminalized conduct and legalized conduct)).
190. Woods, supra note 189, at 693.
191. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-601(a), (c)(2)(ii) (2020).
192. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-801, 801.1 (2020).
193. Maryland has a point system that assigns value based on the
seriousness of the offense. Hon. John P. Morrissey, Schedule of Preset Motor
Vehicle Files and/or Penalty Deposits, Dist. Ct. of Maryland, (Rev. Oct. 2019),
available
at
www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/courtforms/dccr090public.pdf. Driving between one to nine miles per hour over the
speed limit results in only one point and requires no in-court appearance while
driving 30 miles over the speed limit results in five points and is a misdemeanor
criminal offense. Id. at 48. See also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-801.1 (2020)
(stating maximum speed limits) and 26-204 (describing compliance with traffic
citations as either an in-person hearing or the payment of fine, depending on
severity).
194. Id.
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a ticket and send them on their way.195 In contrast, a police officer
observing someone driving 30 miles per hour over the posted speed
limit,196 or searching and finding over 30 grams of marijuana, may
instead make an arrest.197 This is essentially what it means for
certain conduct to be “decriminalized” but still illegal.198
This difference between “decriminalized” and “legalized” leads
courts in decriminalized jurisdictions to find that the analysis of
whether the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause remains
the same after decriminalization.199 The question in the probable
cause analysis is whether the smell indicates to the officer a greater
likelihood that a search will reveal evidence of wrongdoing.200 Prior
to decriminalization, the answer to this question was always in the
affirmative because possessing any amount of marijuana was a
crime.201 The jurisdictions on this side of the debate argue that this
analysis is no different today.202 Possession of 10 grams of
marijuana may only be a civil offense, but it is still an offense.203
While a police officer may not choose to arrest someone for driving
10 miles over the speed limit, the officer does have the option to do
195. Robinson, 152 A.3d at 674 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5601.1 (2020)).
196. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-801.1, 26-202 (2020).
197. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601(a), (c) (2020) (describing
terms of imprisonment as the penalty for possession of controlled substances,
including more than 10 grams of marijuana) with § 5-601.1 (describing the
issuance of a citation as the penalty for possession of less than 10 grams of
marijuana).
198. But see Woods, supra note 189, at 696-700 (explaining that
“decriminalized” conduct is defined and policed differently depending on
jurisdiction and race).
199. See e.g., State v. Senna, 79 A.3d 45, 50-51 (Vt. 2013) (holding legalizing
medical marijuana “does not undermine the significance of the smell of
marijuana as an indicator of criminal activity”).
200. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162 (stating “probable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
'warrant a man of reasonable caution’ in the belief that certain items may be
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime it does not
demand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false.”).
201. See Monique Garcia, Rauner Reduces Punishment for Minor Pot
Possession from Jail to Citation, CHICAGO TRIBUNE. (July 29, 2016),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-illinois-marijuanadecriminalzation-0730-20160729-story.html (stating that prior to the
amendment that decriminalized marijuana in the state of Illinois, possession of
even a small amount of marijuana was a class B misdemeanor that could result
in up to six months in jail and fines of up to $1,500).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, No. 17-59-GMS-1, 2018 WL
1325777, at *3 (Del. Mar. 15, 2018) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4764(d)
(2019)) (stating that marijuana has been decriminalized in some instances in
Delaware, but “every possession and usage of marijuana was not made legal”
and thus, the smell is still indicative of criminal activity).
203. E.g., In re O.S., 112 N.E.3d 621, 634, reh'g denied (July 27, 2018),
appeal denied, 110 N.E.3d 189 (Ill. 2018) (“Because decriminalization is not
synonymous with legalization, even though possession of less than 10 grams of
cannabis is no longer a crime in Illinois, it remains illegal.”).

2020]

The Sativas and Indicas of Proof

211

so because speeding, like possession, is always illegal.204 As such,
an indication of possession, like an odor of marijuana, still makes it
more likely that a search will reveal something illegal.205 Therefore,
the smell of marijuana can provide an officer with probable cause to
conduct a search despite how the state law defines the offense.206
This rationale applies in even those states that have legalized
possession of marijuana, but the focus in these jurisdictions is the
fact that only certain amounts of marijuana are legal to possess.207
The smell indicates that marijuana is present in some amount.208
That mere presence of marijuana warrants further investigation by
the police to determine exactly what amount of marijuana is
present.209 Even though the driver may not possess the criminal
amount of marijuana, the smell still makes it more likely that he or
she did possess the criminal amount of marijuana.210 Therefore,
courts in legalized and decriminalized jurisdictions nonetheless
hold that the smell does establish sufficient probable cause in
support of a vehicle search.211 This is the group that most state
courts are currently siding with, including Washington,212
Maryland,213 Colorado,214 and Arizona.215
204. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (holding
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor
criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by
a fine”).
205. In re O.S., 112 N.E.3d at 634.
206. See e.g., State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Orr. Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining that despite decriminalization of marijuana possession in small
amounts, when an officer smells marijuana he has probable cause to believe
some possession of contraband has occurred and the quantity is irrelevant).
207. See e.g., People v. Fews, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337, 344-45 (2018) (stating
“the continuing regulation of marijuana” allows a police officer to search to
“determine whether the subject of the investigation is adhering to the various
statutory limitations on possession and use, and whether the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of a crime.”).
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Smalley, 225 P.3d at 847-48 (quoting State v. Bingman, 986
P.2d 676, 679 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)) (explaining that there was probable cause for
a search because the officer smelled “the odor of marijuana” emanating from
the car and “testified that, in his experience, the strength of the odor led him to
believe a larger amount of marijuana remained in the car.”).
210. Fews, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 345 (holding the odor of marijuana indicated
“there was a fair probability that a search of the SUV might yield additional
contraband or evidence.”).
211. Id. at 562 (quoting People v. Waxler, 224 Cal. App. 4th 712, 723-24
(2014) “It is well settled that even if a defendant makes only personal use of
marijuana found in the passenger compartment of a car, a police officer may
reasonably suspect additional quantities of marijuana might be found in the
car.”).
212. State v. Tibbles, 236 P.3d 885, 888 (Wash. 2010) (citing State v.
Grande, 187 P.3d 248, 253 (Wash. 2008))
213. Robinson, 152 A.3d at 681.
214. Zuniga, 372 P.3d at 1060.
215. State v. Sisco, 373 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2016).
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2. Courts Against the Smell of Marijuana Establishing
Probable Cause After its Change in Legal Status
In contrast, other courts have found that changing the legal
status of marijuana also necessarily changes the probable cause
analysis.216 These courts hold that the smell of marijuana, after
decriminalization or legalization, is no longer enough on its own to
justify a warrantless search.217 These courts focus not on the
definition of decriminalizing, but instead on the reasons for
decriminalizing.218
The Massachusetts Supreme Court explained this rationale in
Commonwealth v. Cruz, holding that after decriminalizing
possession, the smell of marijuana on its own is not justification for
a warrantless search.219 In its analysis, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court examined the ballot initiative that decriminalized
marijuana220 and the intention of the voters.221 When voters were
asked whether to decriminalize in 2008,222 the ballot explained that
this would change the possession of less than one ounce of
marijuana from a crime to a new system of civil penalties.223
The ballot included arguments in favor and against the law to
inform the voters. In favor, it stated that police would be “freed up”
to focus on serious crimes, saving taxpayers an estimated 30 million
dollars a year in arrest costs.224 Arguments against the law
described decriminalizing as an “endorsement of substance abuse
and dangerous criminal activity.”225 The ballot was passed and
possession of marijuana was decriminalized in the state when the
law went into effect in January of 2009.226 Today, Massachusetts is
one of 12 jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana, but when the
Massachusetts Supreme Court reached its holding in Cruz, the

216. See Commonwealth v. Locke, 51 N.E.3d 484, 504-05 (Mass. App. Ct.
2016) (holding that because possession is a civil infraction, the smell of
marijuana, even coupled with nervous behavior, is not enough for probable
cause).
217. Id.
218. See Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 908-09 (holding that it was the intention of the
voters in passing decriminalization legislation to no longer treat possession of
marijuana at the same level as other criminal conduct).
219. Id. at 910.
220. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2020).
221. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 909 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L
(2017)) (stating “Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary,
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana shall only be a civil offense . . . .”)).
222. See id. at n.19 (describing the process of ballot questions within the
state of Massachusetts).
223. Id. at 909 (citing Information for Voters: 2008 Ballot Questions,
Question 2: Law Proposed by Initiative Petition, Possession of Marijuana).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32L (2020).
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state had only decriminalized.
In Cruz, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that
with the benefit of this written explanation in the ballot, the intent
behind passing the law is clear: possession of marijuana should no
longer be treated as worthy of criminal sanctions.227 By considering
voter intent, the court found that police officers should not put the
same amount of effort into searching for marijuana as they should
put into searching for presently criminalized contraband.228 The
court reasoned that decriminalization means that possession of
marijuana is not a “crime” nor a priority.229 As such, the smell of
marijuana does not indicate to an officer that evidence of a crime
will be found; it merely indicates that someone may be committing
a civil violation.230
Courts on this side of the debate have found evidence that
someone may be committing a civil violation or may be carrying a
legal amount of marijuana is not sufficient to establish probable
cause to justify a warrantless search.231 As of today, New York is
the only state to definitively follow Massachusetts’ example.232
However, both Vermont and Colorado’s Supreme Courts have
signaled they may adopt similar logic.233 The Supreme Court of
Colorado recently held that because a drug-sniffing dog’s alert may
signal only lawful activity, “namely the legal possession of up to one
ounce of marijuana,” officers must have probable cause based on
more than smell to believe the vehicle “contains drugs in violation
of state law” before deploying the dog.234 The Supreme Court of
Vermont recently held that the smell of marijuana and the
defendant’s voluntary surrender of a recreational amount of
marijuana were insufficient to establish probable cause for a search
of his vehicle.235 The court rejected the proposition that “the
presence of an amount of marijuana that is not a crime to possess
is sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant possessed
227. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910 (stating the passing of the law “provides a clear
directive to police departments handling violators to treat commission of this
offense as noncriminal. We conclude that the entire statutory scheme also
implicates police conduct in the field.”).
228. Id. (“Ferreting out decriminalized conduct with the same fervor
associated with the pursuit of serious criminal conduct is neither desired by the
public nor in accord with the plain language of the statute”).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. See also People v. Brukner, 25 N.Y.S.3d 559, 572 (2015) (concluding
that after decriminalization “the mere odor of marijuana emanating from a
pedestrian, without more, does not create reasonable suspicion that a crime has
occurred”).
232. Brukner, 25 N.Y.S. 3d at 570-71.
233. People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019); State v. ClintonAimable, 2020 VT 30.
234. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 414.
235. Clinton-Aimable, 2020 VT 30, ¶33.
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additional marijuana in criminal amounts or drugs other than
marijuana.”236 While this rationale is currently the minority
position, it appears to be gaining popularity and because the
appellate process is lengthy,237 some state supreme courts have not
had the opportunity to rule on the issue since their state passed
legalization.238

B. Illinois Supreme Court Precedent and its Recent
Ruling in People v. Hill Signal that Illinois will
Uphold Warrantless Vehicle Searches Based on the
Smell of Marijuana, Regardless of its Legality in the
State
Illinois Supreme Court precedent concerning the smell of
marijuana must be reviewed in that it informs the court’s current
position and provides an indication of how it may rule on future
cases. Additionally, this precedent informed the court’s March 19,
2020 opinion on the topic in People v. Hill.239 In Hill, the Illinois
Supreme Court signaled the state’s position in the marijuana smell
debate by adopting a policy that the smell of marijuana is still
indicative of a crime and sufficient to establish probable cause for a
warrantless search under the automobile exception.240 While the
court ruled on Hill after legalization, the events that led to the
defendant’s conviction took place in 2017,241 when Illinois law
allowed for only medical marijuana242 and had decriminalized
possession of marijuana in small amounts. 243 As such, the court’s
236. Id.
237. Based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Survey of State Court
Criminal Appeals, 75 percent of felony state appeals are resolved in about 1.5
years and 75 percent of all misdemeanor state appeals are resolved in 1.4 years.
Nicole Waters, Anne Gallegos, James Green & Martha Rozsi, Criminal Appeals
in
State
Courts,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.
7
(Sept.
2015),
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf. However, in a state like Illinois, with
both an intermediary appellate court and a state supreme court, cases take
much longer to resolve with many never reaching the state’s supreme court. Id.
For example, in Illinois, the Supreme Court accepts only about two to four
percent of appeals. ADMIN. OFF. ILLINOIS CTS., ANNUAL REPORT (2018),
available
at
www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2019/2018_Annual_Repo
rt.pdf.
238. People v. Hill ruled on in March 2020, was based on events taking place
in May 2017, prior to legalization in the state of Illinois. Hill, 2020 IL 124595,
¶ 5. State v. Clinton-Aimable ruled on in March 2020, was based on events
taking place in July 2016, prior to legalization in the state of Vermont. ClintonAimable, 2020 CT 30, ¶ 3.
239. Hill, 2020 IL 124595.
240. Id. ¶¶ 31-35.
241. Id. ¶ 5.
242. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/25.
243. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 550/4 (2016).
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holding dealt with how to analyze probable cause based on the smell
of marijuana after decriminalization, not after legalization.244
However, it signals the court’s position and indicates that similar
logic will be applied in cases brought to the Illinois courts today.245
1. Illinois’ Treatment of Probable Cause Determinations
based on Marijuana Odor Prior to Decriminalization
Prior to the state relaxing its laws regulating marijuana, the
Illinois Supreme Court had held that the smell of marijuana was
sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search.246 The
court had so ruled based on the recognized diminished expectation
of privacy under the automobile exception.247 The court has
nonetheless recognized that even vehicle searches could be
unreasonable and must be justified by a showing of possible
criminal activity.248 There was a brief moment in Illinois’ history
where it appeared that the court was moving towards refusing to
accept the mere scent of marijuana as a justification for a
warrantless vehicle search. While this is not the court’s current
position, two cases in the early 1980s present an alternative
analysis to the more modern analysis where the smell of marijuana
establishes probable cause.
Prior to being overruled, two cases seemed to indicate the state
of Illinois would hold officers to a higher standard when
establishing probable cause on the basis of odor, even in the context
of automobile searches.249 The first of the two cases is People v.
Argenian.250 In this case, the officer was investigating a traffic
accident when the officer smelled the odor of marijuana coming
from an unoccupied vehicle.251 The officer searched the car and
discovered a firearm, but not any marijuana.252 There was a pipe in
the vehicle, but it only contained tobacco.253 The vehicle’s owner was
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and moved to
suppress the evidence arguing the officer’s search was not

244. Hill, 2020 IL 124595 ¶ 27.
245. See id. at n.2 (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588
(2018)) (“Although we do not reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is
sufficient to establish probable cause, the smell and presence of cannabis
undoubtedly remains a factor in a probable cause determination.”).
246. Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 498.
247. Id. See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (creating the automobile exception
upon which Illinois based its decision in Stout).
248. Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 502.
249. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d 289; People v. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d 374 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982).
250. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d 289.
251. Id. at 289-90.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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supported by probable cause.254 The officer asserted he had
extensive training in detecting the odor of marijuana despite having
not found the drug in his search.255
Since the officer was undeniably wrong in this instance, the
court reasoned there were only so many explanations as to why the
officer claimed to smell marijuana: (1) there is no discernable
difference between the smell of tobacco and marijuana and thus,
any search on the basis of marijuana odor would be unreasonable;
(2) this particular officer never smelled marijuana at all and simply
asserted that he did smell it to legalize his search; or (3) there is a
discernable difference between the smell of tobacco and the smell of
marijuana, but this particular officer was not trained to detect it
despite his assertions to the contrary.256 The court found that
regardless of which explanation was the truth, the evidence must
be suppressed.257 Importantly, the court stated,
To hold otherwise would be to give an unlimited license to any police
officer to search any and all vehicles merely on his uncorroborated
testimony that he was an expert marijuana sniffer and that he
smelled marijuana in the car. That testimony could conveniently be
used to justify any search at any time whether or not there was
marijuana on the premises and whether or not the officer was a
qualified expert or was honestly mistaken or actually lying. More is
required.258

The second case is People v. Wombacher.259 There, an officer
approached a parked motor vehicle with occupants inside on
suspicion of involvement in a theft.260 The officer claimed he also
saw smoke, and upon nearing the vehicle, he could tell from his
training in detecting the odor, that the smoke was created by
burning marijuana.261 In his search of the vehicle, the officer found
nothing, but the men were arrested regardless.262 In a search
incident to arrest, the officer discovered the men were carrying
small amounts of unburnt marijuana.263 The Illinois Supreme Court
found again that the evidence must be suppressed.264 The court
reasoned that since there was no burning marijuana in the car, the
alleged odor that the officer claimed to detect was not enough to
establish probable cause without additional evidence to corroborate
the presence of marijuana.265
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 290.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 374.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 374-75.
262. Id. at 375.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 377.
265. Id.
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While this was not the case in Wombacher, the court stated
that sufficient probable cause could be established through a
trained officer smelling marijuana if that claim was combined with
other factors.266 For those factors, the court provided examples such
as seeing a marijuana pipe in the vehicle or seeing a burnt
marijuana cigarette in the car’s ashtray.267 Without such a
corroborating factor, the court repeated its concern that allowing
the smell of marijuana, on its own, to constitute sufficient probable
cause for a search would provide police officers with “an unlimited
license to conduct searches.”268
These two cases were overruled269 by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. Stout.270 In Stout, the officer searched a vehicle
after pulling the driver over for a minor traffic stop.271 Just as in
both Argenian272 and Wombacher,273 the officer’s contention that he
smelled marijuana was uncorroborated in that no marijuana was
found in the vehicle.274 Instead, the officer found cocaine, which had
not been burned and could not have produced the smell.275 In
explicitly overturning Argenian and Wombacher, the court found
that the diminished expectation of privacy under the automobile
exception did not require the officer to claim additional
corroborating evidence if he smelled marijuana.276 The court in
Stout stated, “what constitutes probable cause for searches and
seizures must be determined from the standpoint of the arresting
officer, with his skill and knowledge, rather than from the
standpoint of the average citizen under similar circumstances.”277
After this case, the rule in Illinois has been clear: “additional
corroboration is not required where a trained and experienced
police officer detects the odor of cannabis emanating from a

266. Id. at 376-77.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 377 (quoting Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 290).
269. Despite their subsequent overruling, a federal Illinois district court
recently applied the logic of Argenian and Wombacher. See United States v.
Plummer, No. 16-CR-30037-NJR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92863, ¶¶ 16-17 (S.D.
Ill. June 1, 2018) (stating that an officer’s alleged detection of the smell of
marijuana was unreliable because “[t]he fact of the weather conditions that day,
the way [the officer] acted following the alleged smelling of raw cannabis, the
way [the officer] went about his search, and the (less than) .1 gram of cannabis
‘shake’ or ‘crumbs’ that ultimately turned up leads the Court to believe that [the
officer] did not actually smell a ‘strong odor of raw cannabis emitting from
within the interior of the vehicle’”).
270. Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 502.
271. Id. at 499.
272. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 289.
273. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 374.
274. Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 499-500.
275. Id. at 500.
276. Id. at 503.
277. Id. at 502 (quoting People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 419-20 (1983)).
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defendant's vehicle.”278
The court’s decision in Stout is demonstrative of how Illinois
courts have since analyzed probable cause justified by an officer’s
assertion that he smelled marijuana.279 Illinois courts require the
officer to state the training, skill, or knowledge upon which his
detection of the odor is based.280 This is not a difficult requirement
to meet.281 In practice, an officer must simply state in his affidavit
why he is capable of detecting that specific odor, which usually
takes the form of “I have smelled it in my years as a detective.”282
Neither the courts nor Illinois Police Departments require an officer
to have specific training or testing to assure an accurate sense of
smell – the officer’s sworn oath that he has smelled marijuana
before is enough.283
Stout and the cases that followed were ruled on when
possession of marijuana in any quantity was a crime.284 As such,
when these cases were decided, it was true that the smell of
marijuana would always be indicative of a crime.285 Therefore, the
question is raised – is the smell of marijuana still indicative of
criminal activity or is the smell simply indicative of a possible civil
violation? If the latter is true, is an indication of a civil violation
enough to establish probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search?
2. People v. Hill: Illinois Revisits the Probable Cause
Analysis After Decriminalization
In People v. Hill, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause for a
vehicle search, after decriminalization and legal medical marijuana

278. Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 503.
279. See e.g., People v. Zayed, 49 N.E.3d 966, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing
Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 498) (stating “[p]ursuant to Stout and its progeny, the
officer had probable cause because of his training in detecting the smell of
marijuana”).
280. See Zayed, 49 N.E.3d at 971 (stating “the officer has probable cause to
conduct a search of a vehicle if testimony has been elicited that the officer has
training and experience in the detection of controlled substances.”).
281. Id. (finding probable cause because the officer testified under oath that
he was trained in recognizing the smell of cannabis and had smelled the odor of
burnt cannabis hundreds of times).
282. Zayed, 49 N.E. 3d at 971. See also Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 499 (holding the
officer was qualified because he “testified that he had smelled the odor of
burning cannabis on ‘numerous other occasions’ during his seven-year
employment as a patrol officer.”).
283. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text.
284. Decriminalization in the state of Illinois was not until 2016. 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 550/4 (d).
285. See e.g., Stout, 477 N.E.2d at 502 (explaining that the reasonableness
of police officer conduct is weighed against their responsibility to prevent crime
and to catch criminals and thus smelling marijuana, a crime to possess, is
reasonable justification for a search).
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were in effect.286 While the stop that gave rise to the case took place
prior to legalization, the appeal nonetheless provided the Illinois
Supreme Court an opportunity to guide how police officers in the
state should be investigating and policing marijuana today.287
Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court failed to answer that
question definitively, instead, finding that the officer relied on more
than the mere smell of marijuana in his probable cause analysis.288
While the case did not foreclose a future ruling to the contrary,
People v. Hill indicates that the Illinois court system will continue
to accept an officer’s uncorroborated assertion that he smelled
marijuana as probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search.289
Defendant Charles Hill was charged with unlawful possession
of cocaine after his vehicle was searched in a traffic stop by Officer
Baker of the Decatur Police Department.290 At a Motion to Suppress
hearing, the officer testified that he initiated his traffic stop because
he believed that the passenger in Mr. Hill’s car was a known
fugitive.291 When the officer activated his lights, Mr. Hill failed to
immediately pull his vehicle over.292 The officer testified that, in his
experience, this indicates that the occupants are attempting to
conceal or destroy contraband or retrieve a weapon.293 After he
approached, the officer quickly realized that the passenger was not
who he thought he was, but he smelled “the strong odor of raw
cannabis,” and asked if there was marijuana in the vehicle.294 Mr.
Hill denied possessing or recently smoking marijuana, but his
passenger informed the officer that the smell may be coming from
him as he had smoked earlier that day.295 The officer stated that he
saw “a bud in the backseat” and he searched the vehicle.296 The
286. The exact question before the court was:
Whether police may still search a vehicle without a warrant following a
traffic stop based solely on a perceived odor of cannabis, or whether the
State legislature’s decision to decriminalize possession of less than 10
grams of cannabis requires officers to justify their search based on
specific evidence that the occupant possesses more than 10 grams.
Kerry Bryson & Shawn O’Toole, Summary of Significant Criminal Issues
Pending in the Illinois Supreme Court, ST. APP. DEFENDER 9 (Jan. 31, 2020),
www2.illinois.gov/osad/Publications/Documents/pend.pdf.
287. John Seasly, Illinois Supreme Court to decide whether smell of pot is
grounds to search a car, INJUSTICE WATCH (Jan. 14, 2020),
www.injusticewatch.org/news/2020/illinois-supreme-court-to-decide-whethersmell-of-pot-is-grounds-to-search-a-car/.
288. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 35.
289. Id.
290. Id. ¶ 1.
291. Id. ¶ 5.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. ¶ 5-6.
295. Id. ¶ 9-10.
296. Id. ¶ 10.
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officer found a small rock of crack-based cocaine and “a small
amount of cannabis residue.”297
Mr. Hill moved to suppress the evidence found in the search of
his vehicle, claiming that the officer did not have probable cause in
support of the search.298 Mr. Hill won his motion to suppress, but
the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, stating that the officer did
have probable cause because he smelled marijuana.299 In his
petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Mr. Hill
argued that the legalization of medical cannabis and the
decriminalization of small amounts of cannabis altered the police’s
power to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based solely on
the odor of marijuana.300
Despite granting the appeal on this narrow issue, the Illinois
Supreme Court failed to definitively answer whether the smell of
marijuana on its own justifies a warrantless search, instead, finding
that the officer, under these specific facts, had probable cause based
on more than smell.301 Mr. Hill argued that medical legalization and
decriminalization meant that possession is no longer a criminal
activity, nor is marijuana contraband, and therefore, the odor of
marijuana is insufficient to establish probable cause. 302 The court
analyzed the effect of medical marijuana and decriminalization
separately.303 As to decriminalization, the court agreed with other
jurisdictions304 that “decriminalization is not synonymous with
legalization.” 305 “Because cannabis remains unlawful to possess,
any amount of marijuana is considered contraband.”306
The court did agree with the defendant that the
Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act307
permits possession of cannabis, and thus, when possessed by a
medical user, marijuana is not contraband.308 However, the court
rejected the idea that because it may be legally possessed in some
circumstances, officers need more facts to suggest it is illegally
possessed or connected to criminal activity.309 The court stated that
297. Id. ¶ 7 n.1.
298. Id. ¶ 4.
299. Id. ¶ 12.
300. Id. ¶ 15.
301. Id. ¶ 15-16.
302. Id. ¶ 25.
303. Id. ¶ 26.
304. Compare id. ¶ 31 (stating, “While the decriminalization of cannabis
diminished the penalty for possession of no more than 10 grams of cannabis to
a civil law violation punishable by a fine, possession of cannabis remained
illegal”), with Robinson, 152 A.3d 661 at 680 (stating, “Despite the
decriminalization of possession of less than ten grams of marijuana, possession
of marijuana in any amount remains illegal in Maryland.”).
305. In re O.S., 112 N.E.3d at 634.
306. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 29 (quoting Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 911).
307. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/1 et. seq. (2020).
308. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 32.
309. Id. ¶ 33-34.
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medical “users must possess and use cannabis in accordance with
the act” and pointed to the portion of the statute stating that a
driver or passenger is prohibited from possessing cannabis within
an area of the motor vehicle “except in a sealed, tamper-evident
medical cannabis container.”310
The court ruled that there was probable cause based on the
following facts: (1) Mr. Hill’s delay in pulling over after the officer
initiated his traffic stop; (2) the officer’s testimony that based on his
experience, vehicles delaying in pulling over are hiding contraband
or retrieving a weapon; (3) the passenger revealed he had smoked
marijuana that day; and (4) the officer “saw a loose ‘bud’ in the
backseat and smelled the strong odor of marijuana which, together,
indicate that cannabis was in the car, and likely, not properly
contained.”311
This holding did not foreclose future defendants from making
similar arguments when an officer bases probable cause on the
smell of marijuana alone,312 but it raised more questions than it
answered. First, is the court suggesting that the smell of marijuana
in a traffic stop is per se probable cause to suspect a person is
improperly storing their legally possessed marijuana?313 The court
seemed to suggest that it may when it compared Mr. Hill’s case to
cases in which an officer smelled alcohol and performed a search
based on a suspected violation of open container laws.314 Notably,
the court cited only cases in which there was an additional
corroborating factor suggesting the driver had an open container of
alcohol,315 such as “seeing two open beer cans.”316 Additionally, in
the court’s ruling in Hill, it made clear that it was the loose “bud”
together with the smell of marijuana that indicated marijuana may
be improperly stored in the vehicle,317 suggesting smell alone may
not have been sufficient.
Secondly, will the court be able to apply the same logic when it
rules on a case arising from a stop that took place after legalization?
The court admitted that legalizing possession means marijuana is
not “contraband,” for those complying with the Act that legalized
medical marijuana.318 With legalization in Illinois, will the Illinois
310. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-502(1(b), (c) (2016)).
311. Id. ¶ 35.
312. See id. ¶ 18 n.2 (citing Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588) (“Although we do not
reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is sufficient to establish probable
cause, the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly remains a factor in a
probable cause determination.”).
313. Id. ¶ 34.
314. Id. ¶ 34-36.
315. Id. ¶ 36 (citing People v. Smith, 447 N.E. 2d 809 (Ill. 1983); People v.
Gray, 420 N.E. 2d 856 (Ill. 1981); People v. Zeller, 367 N.E.2d 488 (1977)).
316. Id. (citing Gray, 420 N.E. 2d at 856).
317. Id. ¶ 35.
318. Id. ¶ 32, 34.
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Supreme Court’s holding in Hill319 apply only to those searches
conducted before January 1, 2020? Does this holding give police
officers license to search any vehicle if they assert that their
warrantless search was based on the smell of marijuana, which in
their experience, indicates improper storage of a legal substance?320
While there are future arguments to be made, People v. Hill
nonetheless signals the Illinois Supreme Court’s reluctance to
explicitly hold that the smell of marijuana cannot alone justify a
warrantless vehicle search.321 Although the court did not reach
whether the odor alone is sufficient to establish probable cause, the
court’s position is that the smell of marijuana “undoubtedly remains
a factor in a probable cause determination.”322 As such, all lower
courts in Illinois remain unlikely to suppress evidence based on
these warrantless searches, and Illinois’ policy of accepting an
officer’s assertion that he smelled marijuana remains intact.

C. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Probable
Cause Relies on Flawed Misconceptions about
Marijuana Smell Accuracy, Contradicts the
Legislature’s Intent, and Frustrates Economic Goals
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Hill signals
that Illinois courts will continue to uphold warrantless vehicle
searches based on an officer’s assertion that he smelled
marijuana.323 This position is flawed in 2 important ways: (1) it
relies on a misconception that police officers can accurately detect
marijuana, and (2) it frustrates the State’s economic and social
goals, contradicting the very reasons the state chose to first
decriminalize, and then legalize.
1. Illinois’ Holding Relies on a Misconception that Police
Officers can Accurately Detect Marijuana
Allowing officers to justify warrantless searches of motor
vehicles relies on a misconception that the officers can accurately
detect the scent of marijuana.324 This underlying assumption that
319. Id. ¶ 37.
320. Id. ¶ 34-36.
321. See id. ¶ 29 (explaining that marijuana remains “contraband”
regardless of decriminalization because, “to hold otherwise leads to the absurd
conclusion that persons could have a legitimate privacy interest in an item that
remains illegal to possess”).
322. See id. ¶ 18 n.2 (citing Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588) (“Although we do not
reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is sufficient to establish probable
cause, the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly remains a factor in a
probable cause determination.”).
323. Id.
324. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text.
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police officers are capable of smelling marijuana is simply
unproven.325 The sense of smell is generally less reliable and
consistent than other senses, such as sight.326 Courts have
addressed the limitations of relying on smell alone pointing out the
ability of smell to linger327 or travel.328 Further, while sight is
quantifiable on a widespread scale because of the prevalence of
testing,329 the reliability of an individual’s sense of smell is not
commonly tested.330 The reliability of smell can also be affected by
multiple factors both environmental and genetic.331 There is a
widely accepted belief that people, and more specifically police
officers, can detect the scent of marijuana,332 but “the empirical
basis for such claims is remarkably thin.”333
Recognizing the gap in quantifiable data and the wide
acceptance of probable cause on the basis of smell, scientists at the
Smell and Taste Center of the University of Pennsylvania’s Medical
School conducted an experiment.334 The study showed that while
the smell of marijuana was discernable through a garbage bag
immediately in front of a participant, it was not discernable once
that bag was placed in the trunk of a vehicle.335 The study showed
325. See generally Richard L. Doty et al., Marijuana Odor Perception:
Studies Modeled from Probable Cause Cases, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 223 (Apr.
2004).
326. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating
sense of smell is less reliable than the senses of sight and touch).
327. See Sprow, Wake Up, supra note 101, at 302 (citing Brewer v. State,
199 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (discussing potential for smell to linger
in a location for an undetermined amount of time)).
328. See Sprow, Wake Up, supra note 101, at 302 (citing People v. Taylor,
564 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Mich. 1997) (suggesting that the odor of marijuana could
travel in a car that has never contained marijuana)).
329. For more information, see Celia Vimont, What Does 20/20 Vision
Mean?, AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2016), www.aao.org/eyehealth/tips-prevention/what-does-20-20-vision-mean.
A person with 20/20 vision can see what an average individual can see
on an eye chart when they are standing 20 feet away . . . .
An eye chart measures visual acuity, which is the clarity or sharpness of
vision. The top number refers to your distance in feet from the chart. The
bottom number indicates the distance at which a person with normal
eyesight can read the same line.
Id.
330. Doty et al., supra note 325, at 223 (explaining that although scientists
are able to test a person’s ability to smell, it is not a common procedure).
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Goetzl, Common Scents, supra note 105, at 611 (stating “there
is no reason to afford less weight to one's use of the sense of smell . . . when
looking to probabilities.”).
333. Avery N. Gilbert & Joseph A. DiVerdi, Human Olfactory Detection of
Packaged Cannabis, 60 SCI. & JUST. 169, 169 (2020).
334. Doty et al., supra note 325, at 223.
335. Id. at 231.
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that participants were unable to discern the smell of marijuana
when diesel exhaust fumes were nearby.336 The study further found
that participants who believed themselves capable of detecting
marijuana were more likely to believe they had smelled it when
there was no marijuana present.337 In short, this study found that
“claims made by police officers were implausible when tested
experimentally.”338
While this is the only published study to focus on the smell of
marijuana in typical search and seizure encounters, its findings
suggest at least that courts, like those in Illinois, should not accept
an officer’s mere claim that he smelled marijuana. It may be
possible to enhance a person’s ability to detect a certain smell
through training,339 but there is nothing to suggest that law
enforcement officers have been trained in such a way.340 Further, a
more recent study that tested the ability of individuals to detect the
smell of marijuana in different types of containers discovered that,
in the right conditions, a person can smell marijuana in both a
sealed Ziploc bag and a sealed pop-cap container. 341 The study’s
authors provided multiple reasons for why their results are not
applicable to police officers conducting traffic stops, such as their
use of strains known for their “distinct aroma profiles,”342 the
dilution to the smell caused by the larger air volume of a vehicle,
the potential use of “physically partitioned storage spaces” like
glove compartments, and the presence of “competing ambient odors”
in a real-world situation.343
However, this study used five grams of marijuana,344 a legal
possession amount in Illinois,345 and found that the smell of
marijuana was detected, even when placed inside a sealed
container346 like that required in Illinois for motor vehicle
transport.347 Thus, the results refute one important point suggested
by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hill: the smell of
marijuana cannot reliably indicate to a police officer that marijuana
within the vehicle is improperly contained.348
336. Id.
337. Id. at 231-32.
338. Gilbert & DiVerdi, supra note 333, at 169 (citing Doty et al., supra note
325, at 223-233).
339. See, e.g., Richard S. Smith et al., Smell And Taste Function In The
Visually Impaired, 53 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 649, 655 (1993) (testing
the change in smelling ability in the visually impaired before and after training
exercises meant to improve smell detecting ability).
340. Doty et al., supra note 325, at 231.
341. Gilbert & DiVerdi, supra note 333, at 170.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 171.
344. Id. at 170.
345. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/10-10.
346. Gilbert & DiVerdi, supra note 333, at 170.
347. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/30(2)(E).
348. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 35.
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The results of this recent container study and the University
of Pennsylvania study suggest that the underlying presumption
that officers are able to detect marijuana in a traffic stop with their
sense of smell is not based in fact.349 The authors of the study
suggest that just as with drug-sniffing dogs, “standardized
procedures are needed to establish the smell ability of law
enforcement officers who are called on to testify about odors of illicit
drugs.”350 Until such a standardized system exists, the underlying
assumption that an officer can actually detect marijuana using his
sense of smell during a traffic stop is not supported by evidence.351
Considering the lack of scientific data and police training on
marijuana smells, Illinois should not base its rulings affecting
privacy rights on unsubstantiated claims.
2. Frustrates the Social and Economic Goals behind
Decriminalization and Legalization
Illinois’ policy that the smell of marijuana provides sufficient
probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle
contradicts the intention behind decriminalization and legalization,
frustrating the state’s goals.352
a. Social Goals
The legislative intent behind amending Illinois statutes to
decriminalize possession of small amounts of marijuana was to
lessen the prison population and refocus police resources towards
more serious criminal offenders.353 Further, Bruce Rauner, the
Republican governor in office when the amendment passed, cited
the difficulty incarceration imposes on a family, both emotionally
and financially, especially as released offenders struggle to obtain
employment.354 Illinois passed decriminalization with the goal of
treating possession of small amounts of marijuana in the same
manner as traffic offenses.355 Public ballots reflected that Illinois
citizens agreed with these positions and preferred that police
energy and resources be focused more towards serious criminal

349. Doty et al., supra note 325, at 231.
350. Id. at 232.
351. Id.
352. For a discussion on the goals of decriminalization on the national scale,
see Woods, supra note 189.
353. Krisai, supra note 16.
354. Bryant Jackson-Green, Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner Signs Marijuana
Decriminalization Bill, ILL. POL’Y (July 29, 2016), www.illinoispolicy.org/
rauner-signs-marijuana-decriminalization-bill/.
355. Krisai, supra note 16 (stating that decriminalization would allow law
enforcement to issue infractions, similar to how traffic laws are enforced).
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conduct.356
While the goals behind decriminalizing were certainly
admirable, Illinois’ legalization legislation earned the state
widespread respect and positive press.357 When Governor Pritzker
signed The Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act,358 Illinois became the
first state whose legislation both legalized sale and possession of
marijuana and sought to reduce the harm to communities most
affected by the war on drugs.359 While white people and black people
use marijuana at similar rates, a black person in America is 3.64
times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a
white person.360 This rate of racial disparity was much worse in
Illinois, however, where a black person in 2018 was 7.51 times more
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white
person.361
The Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act attempts to reduce this
impact on black communities by undoing the past and creating
opportunities for the future.362 The Act automatically expunges past
convictions for possession of up to 30 grams of marijuana and
creates a more streamlined process for expunging convictions for
possession of between 30 and 500 grams of marijuana.363 In total,
770,000 marijuana-related records became eligible for
expungement under the Act.364 As for future growth, the Act
established a 20 million dollar low-interest loan program for
qualified “social equity applicants,” to “defray the start-up costs
associated with entering the licensed cannabis industry.”365 A social

356. Tom Angell, Voters in Illinois’ Cook County Approve Marijuana
Legalization
Ballot
Measure,
FORBES
(Mar.
20,
2018),
www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/03/20/illinois-voters-approve-marijuanalegalization-ballot-measure/#3512f4a87951.
357. E.g., Candice Norwood, Why Illinois' Marijuana Legalization Law Is
Different
From
All
Others,
GOVERNING
(June
11,
2019),
www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-illinois-marijuanalegalization-legislature.html; Ben Curren, “The Gold Standard”: Lessons From
Illinois
On
Cannabis
Legalization,
FORBES
(July
1,
2019),
www.forbes.com/sites/bencurren/2019/07/01/the-gold-standard-lessons-fromillinois-on-cannabis-legalization/#394a7b583ec1.
358. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/1 et seq.
359. Curren, supra note 357.
360. A Tale of Two Countries: Racially Targeted Arrests in the Era of
Marijuana
Reform,
ACLU
5
(Apr.
2020),
www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/042020-marijuanareport.pdf.
361. Id. at 32.
362. New Illinois Legalization Bill Means Unprecedented Social and
Criminal Justice Reform, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Dec. 2019),
www.mpp.org/states/illinois/new-illinois-legalization-bill-meansunprecedented-social-and-criminal-justice-reform/.
363. Id.
364. Curren, supra note 357.
365.
Adult
Use
Cannabis
Summary,
ILLINOIS.GOV,
www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/20242-Summary_of_HB_1438
__The_Cannabis_Regulation_and_Tax_Act.pdf (last visited May 7, 2020).
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equity applicant is an Illinois resident with at least 51 percent
ownership in the business who has resided in a disproportionately
impacted area366 or who has been arrested or convicted of a
marijuana-related crime, now subject to expungement.367
These social goals were a primary driving force towards
legalization in the state of Illinois. As Governor Pritzker described
the law’s provisions in a press conference, he made that intent clear,
stating, “For the many individuals and families whose lives have
been changed – indeed hurt – because the nation’s war on drugs
discriminated against people of color, this day belongs to you.”368
b. Economic Goals
In addition to the social policies above, a primary goal behind
Illinois’ decision to decriminalize marijuana was economic, as was
its later decision to legalize.369 As to decriminalization, the Illinois
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council analyzed the benefits and
estimated a net profit in the three years following decriminalization
to land between 19.3 million dollars and 23.9 million dollars.370
Specifically, the costs associated with arrest, processing, and
incarcerations of those possessing less than 10 grams of marijuana
between 2012 and 2015 was 13.1 million dollars, a cost that would
drop to 0 dollars after decriminalization.371 If possession of
marijuana was a civil infraction over the same period of time, it
would have not only saved the state millions of dollars, but also
generated over 9 million dollars in revenue.372
This study also examined the impact decriminalization would
have on law enforcement in Illinois by examining the time saved by
processing a civil violation instead of a criminal violation.373
Between 2012 and 2014, Illinois law enforcement arrested 90,783
people for possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana.374 As civil
violations do not require transporting the offender to a station,
366. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/1-10 (defining “Disproportionately
Impacted Area” based on the area’s rates of poverty, unemployment, and
arrests, convictions, and incarcerations related to cannabis).
367. Id.
368. Jessica Corbett, Equity-Centric Bill to Legalize Recreational Marijuana
Introduced by Illinois Dems, COMMON DREAMS (May 6, 2019),
www.commondreams.org/news/2019/05/06/equity-centric-bill-legalizerecreational-marijuana-introduced-illinois-dems.
369. Krisai, supra note 16.
370. ILL. SENTENCING POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, H.R.B. 4257 & S.B. 2228
Reductions for Possession of Cannabis Under 500 Grams 1 (Mar. 8, 2016),
available
at
www.spac.icjia-api.cloud/uploads/HB4357_SB2228_Cannabis
_Analysis_030816_UPDATED-20200106T18340271.pdf.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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fingerprinting, booking, or arrest paperwork, an officer has more
time to focus on more serious offenses after decriminalization.375
Assuming the process of writing a ticket would take about 15
minutes, officers would have an additional 26,696 hours over the
span of three years to devote to other police work.376 This benefit of
decriminalization was demonstrated in Chicago, a city that
decriminalized possession in 2012.377 In 2011, Chicago police
reported 21,000 arrests for marijuana possession, but after the city
passed its decriminalization ordinance in 2012, that figure steadily
dropped resulting in only 94 arrests in 2017.378 Hoping for similar
economic savings, and in part due to the findings of the Illinois
Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, Illinois decriminalized
possession of small amounts of marijuana in 2017.379
Legalization was similarly motivated by an economic need in
the state of Illinois. Illinois has struggled with financial crises for
over a decade, receiving the lowest credit score among all states in
the nation.380 When he took office, Governor J.B. Pritzker inherited
a 2.8 billion dollar budget deficit.381 Recognizing the need to
generate revenue and boost the state’s economy, the Illinois
Economic Policy Institute and the Project for Middle Class Renewal
studied the financial impact of legalizing marijuana in Illinois.382
The resulting report estimated that if marijuana were legalized and
taxed, an estimated 1.6 billion dollars would be sold in the state,
generating 525 million dollars in new tax revenue.383 Further, the
report concluded that Illinois taxpayers would save “18.4 million
annually in reduced incarceration costs, law enforcement spending,
and legal fees.”384 The governor’s budget estimated that the state
would collect 28 million dollars in cannabis tax revenue before June
30, 2020, but the state is on track to surpass that estimate.385 In the
375. Id.
376. ILL. SENTENCING POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 369, at 7.
377. Frank Main, Marijuana Arrests in Chicago Plummet, but Blacks are
‘Vast Majority’ of Cases, CHI. SUN TIMES (July 13, 2018),
www.chicago.suntimes.com/cannabis/marijuana-arrests-enforcement-chicagopolice-declines-possession-blacks-african-americans-most-often-chargedticketed-cannabis-weed-watchdogs/.
378. Id.
379. Garcia, supra note 195.
380. Ted Dabrowski & John Klingner, The History of Illinois’ Fiscal Crisis,
Illinois Policy, ILLINOIS POL’Y INST., www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/the-historyof-illinois-fiscal-crisis/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
381. Adam Schuster, A 5-Year Plan to Balance Illinois’ Budget, Pay off Debt,
& Cut Taxes, ILLINOIS POL’Y INST., www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/the-historyof-illinois-fiscal-crisis/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
382. Frank Mazo IV et al., The Financial Impact of Legalizing Marijuana in
Illinois, ILL. UPDATE (Nov. 9, 2018), illinoisepi.files.wordpress.com/
2018/11/ilepi-pmcr-financial-impact-of-legalizing-marijuana-in-illinoisfinal.pdf.
383. Id. at 4-5.
384. Id. at 3.
385. Ally Marotti, Recreational Marijuana Sales in Illinois Generated More
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state’s first month of legalization alone, Illinois generated over 10
million dollars in tax revenue.386
The allocation of tax revenue reflects again the state’s priority
on both social and economic goals. For example, while 35 percent of
the revenue goes to the state’s general fund, 10 percent is dedicated
to Illinois’ backlog of unpaid bills, and 25 percent of the revenue is
dedicated to community development projects in areas with high
arrest and poverty rates that were disproportionately affected by
the war on drugs.387 The Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act is
explicit in the legislature’s intention of achieving both social and
economic goals.388 It states,
In the interest of allowing law enforcement to focus on violent and
property crimes, generating revenue for education, substance abuse
prevention, and treatment, freeing public resources to invest in
communities and other public purposes, and individual freedom, the
General Assembly finds and declares that the use of cannabis should
be legal . . . .389

c.

The Social and Economic Goals are Frustrated by the
Illinois Supreme Court formally adopting a policy that
the smell of marijuana justifies a warrantless search

Illinois courts continuing to hold that the smell of marijuana is
indicative of criminal activity directly contradicts the social and
economic goals behind decriminalizing, and legalizing marijuana
possession. Such a policy undermines the legislative intent to
redirect police efforts and restructure the state’s criminal justice
system towards more serious criminal offenders.390 It lowers the
economic and social benefits of legalizing, by reinforcing the very
police practices that the state sought to address.391 When the court
allows police officers to search based on the smell of marijuana, it
indicates that searching for marijuana is a worthwhile use of police
time.392 It indicates that police officers are still justified in
expending resources in the search for a substance that is legal to

than $10 Million in Tax Revenue in January, CHI. TRIBUNE (Feb. 25, 2020),
www.chicagotribune.com/marijuana/illinois/ct-biz-illinois-legal-weed-taxevenue-20200224-iorl7m53qfburbrh7lv7gzszhm-story.html.
386. Id.
387. Adult Use Cannabis Summary, supra note 365, at 7.
388. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/1-10 (2020).
389. Id. § 1-10(a) (2020).
390. See Krisai, supra note 16; Jackson-Green, supra note 354.
391. See ACLU, supra note 360, at 5 (discussing Illinois’s racial disparities
as the third worst in the United States); Adult Use Cannabis Summary, supra
note 365 (stating that the goal is investing in communities that have suffered
through the war on drugs).
392. Woods, supra note 189, at 736.
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possess.393 It lowers the economic savings and undermines the
legislative intent to end the racial disparities of marijuana
policing.394 This expenditure of resources is contradictory to the goal
of deprioritizing marijuana possession and refocusing police power
towards violent crimes.395 The smell of marijuana only indicates
that marijuana may be present.396 It does not indicate that a
criminal amount is present or that marijuana is improperly
contained.397 The mere smell of marijuana does not tell an officer
anything about a potential suspect’s propensity for violence398 or
drug use.399 Therefore, continuing to allow police officers to search
on these grounds frustrates the state’s goals.

IV. PROPOSAL
When the Illinois Supreme Court reached its decision in People
v. Hill it signaled that the smell of marijuana will remain sufficient
justification for warrantless searches.400 This policy fails to
recognize the purposes of decriminalization and legalization and

393. Id.
394. See Mazo et al., supra note 382, at 3 (concluding that reduced law
enforcement spending associated with the policing of marijuana possession
would save the taxpayers 5.21 million dollars).
395. See Woods, supra note 189, at 740 (citing Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of
Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2257, 2268 (2002); Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment,
100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) (arguing there is harm to communities and
affected motorists when police aggressively target “suspicions of wholly
noncriminal conduct that voters and legislatures determined does not carry the
type of moral culpability as crimes do, and that might be afforded weaker
substantive and procedural protections as a result of being adjudicated in the
administrative realm”)).
396. See generally Doty et al., supra note 325 (testing the ability of
individuals to detect the smell of marijuana in circumstances similar to a traffic
stop).
397. See generally Gilbert & DiVerdi, supra note 333 (testing the ability of
individuals to detect the smell of marijuana in containers with varying degrees
of sealing).
398 See Mazo et al., supra note 382, at 9 (citing Erin Brodwin, We Took a
Scientific Look at Whether Weed or Alcohol is Worse for You and There Appears
to be a Winner, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2018), www.businessinsider.com/alcoholmarijuana-which-worse-health-2017-11) (stating “[t]here is some evidence that
marijuana users may actually be less likely to commit violence against a
partner.”).
399 Id. (citing Hefei Wen & Jason Hockenberry, Association of Medical and
Adult-Use Marijuana Laws with Opioid Prescribing for Medicaid Enrollees, 178
HEALTH CARE POL’Y & L. 673, 673-679 (2018) (discussing study that found that
opiate-related deaths decreased by about 33 percent in 13 states in the six years
after medical marijuana was legalized).
400. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 18 n.2 (citing Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588)
(“Although we do not reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is sufficient to
establish probable cause, the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly
remains a factor in a probable cause determination.”).
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frustrates the state’s economic and social goals. Decriminalization
was an effort by Illinois lawmakers to stop prioritizing the policing
and prosecution of citizens possessing small amounts of
marijuana.401 Legalization was even more explicit in its economic
and social purposes, making Illinois the first state to pass
legislation that not only legalizes possession, but also attempts to
undo years of discriminatory policing.402 By adopting a policy that
the odor of marijuana is still indicative of criminal activity after
decriminalizing possession of marijuana, Illinois courts have
directly contradicted that effort.
This proposal asserts that the Illinois Supreme Court should
accept review of a case involving a warrantless vehicle search that
took place after legalization passed and was based on an officer’s
assertion that he smelled marijuana. The court should definitively
hold that, after legalization, the smell of marijuana does not
establish probable cause to more accurately reflect the legislative
intent behind legalization.403 This section proposes that Illinois
should follow the example set by Massachusetts in Commonwealth
v. Cruz and require an additional fact in support of probable cause
that shows suspicion of criminal activity, not simply suspicion of
marijuana possession.404 Illinois could rely on its own predecriminalization precedent in Argenian405 and Wombacher406 as
the groundwork for adopting such a policy. This section will
highlight the benefits of refusing to accept the smell of marijuana
as sufficient to establish probable cause and suggest that doing so
would better serve Illinois’ budgetary and social goals.
The Illinois Supreme Court should accept certiorari of a case
that would definitively answer the questions left open by People v.
Hill. Illinois should follow the example of Massachusetts and adopt
a policy that the odor of marijuana, on its own, cannot establish
probable cause for a warrantless search, even in the vehicle
context.407 As discussed in more detail above, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Cruz held that the odor of
marijuana emanating from a driver’s car, detected by a trained
401. See Savannah Eadens, Decriminalization May be Road to Legalization
in Illinois, CHRON. (Feb. 19, 2018), www.columbiachronicle.com/
metro/article_b7f32c32-12c2-11e8-a282-bb65f098d764.html
(stating
that
lawmakers in Illinois pushed for decriminalization due to concerns regarding
public safety, the state’s budget crisis, and incarceration rates amongst nonviolent offenders); Jackson-Green, supra note 354 (describing rationale behind
decriminalizing in Illinois as “not only does this reform stop wasting police
resources that can be better focused on more serious crimes, it’ll save the state
millions in enforcement and incarceration costs.”).
402. Curren, supra note 357.
403. Corbett, supra note 368.
404. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910.
405. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 290.
406. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 374.
407. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910.
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police officer, did not provide that officer with sufficient probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search because “no facts were
articulated to support probable cause to believe that a criminal
amount of contraband was present in the car.”408 Therefore,
Massachusetts adopted a policy that the officer cannot rely on the
smell of marijuana alone to establish probable cause, but must
present an additional fact to support a suspicion that the driver
possesses more than one ounce, the criminalized amount in the
state.409
Illinois’ legal system should adopt a policy mirroring that of the
Massachusetts court. In practice, this would mean that an officer
basing his probable cause assessment on his detection of the smell
of marijuana would also be required to state a corroborating fact
that indicates the smell is tied to criminal activity.410 For example,
the officer must have reason to believe that the person is
transporting a criminal amount of marijuana or is currently
intoxicated while driving.411 The corroboration could include, as
suggested in People v. Hill, marijuana improperly stored in plain
view. However, the court must recognize that smell is not the same
as sight and reject Hill’s suggestion that the smell may indicate
improper containment. If the only conclusion that can be drawn
from the officer’s facts in support of his probable cause
determination is that the driver may possess marijuana in some
amount, there is no justification for a search because possession of
marijuana is legal in the state of Illinois. Therefore, an officer
suspecting possession of marijuana does not have probable cause to
justify a warrantless vehicle search, and Illinois courts should
suppress any evidence discovered.412
Illinois has already laid the groundwork for adopting such a
policy in its previously overturned cases of Argenian413 and
Wombacher.414 Had these cases not been overturned, the policy in
Illinois would already be very similar to this proposal. The holdings
required that an officer who asserts that his probable cause analysis
was based on the smell of marijuana must also provide an
408. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 913.
409. Massachusetts has continued to apply its holding in Cruz to cases
involving probable cause determinations based on the scent of marijuana. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Lobo, 978 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (holding that
a police officer's detection of odor of “freshly burnt marijuana” following vehicle
stop did not justify exit order in absence of other evidence of criminal activity);
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 985 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 2013) (holding possession of a
small quantity of marijuana (one ounce or less), standing alone, will not support
the search of a person, a backpack, or a vehicle for an additional quantity of
marijuana or other evidence of criminal activity).
410. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 910.
411. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501 (2020).
412. Suppression is the remedy for evidence seized in an illegal search or
seizure. See discussion supra note 35.
413. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 290.
414. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 374.
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additional corroborating fact.415 As the court provided in
Wombacher, this additional corroborating fact could be that the
officer saw a partially burnt marijuana cigarette in the vehicle’s
ashtray.416 However, if the only factual support for the officer’s
probable cause determination was the odor of marijuana, the court
found probable cause lacking and the evidence was suppressed.417
These cases were ruled on 30 years prior to decriminalization,
when possession of marijuana in any amount was a felony.418 Yet,
they were more progressive and protected the privacy of Illinois
citizens more than the post-legalization holding of People v. Hill.
The current policy is especially troubling as the only limit on
whether the smell of marijuana provides sufficient probable cause
is an officer’s mere assertion that his training helped him detect the
smell.419 Not only does evidence suggest that these officers are
incapable of detecting the smell in a traffic stop context,420 but the
required training is undefined, unregulated, and would potentially
be ineffective regardless.421 Clearly, Illinois courts should revisit
this issue now that the state has redefined the legal status of
marijuana. As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Argenian,
allowing an officer’s mere assertion that he smelled marijuana to
establish probable cause “could conveniently be used to justify any
search at any time.”422
Adopting the policy proposed here would better accomplish the
state of Illinois’ social and economic goals. Legalization was
intended to shift the incarceration population towards violent
offenders and save Illinois taxpayers and police officers time and
money by refocusing their efforts towards those offenders.423 The
legislation intended to save money ordinarily spent on arresting,
prosecuting, and jailing citizens possessing small amounts of
marijuana while also generating revenue through taxable sales.424
Adopting a policy that the odor of marijuana does not provide
sufficient probable cause, unless corroborated by a fact indicating
criminal conduct, is required to accomplish these goals. Otherwise,
the police, the courts, and the state itself will continue to expend
resources on searches resulting from the smell of marijuana.
415. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 290; Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 377.
416. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 376 (citing People v. Loe, 306 N.E.2d 368,
369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)).
417. Id.
418. Wombacher, 433 N.E.2d at 374-75 (stating defendant was charged with
unlawful possession of cannabis after officers discovered a small amount of
marijuana).
419. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text.
420. Doty et al., supra note 325, at 231.
421. Smith et al., supra note 339, at 655.
422. Argenian, 423 N.E.2d at 290.
423. See discussion supra Section III.D.
424. See discussion supra Section III.D.
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However, if Illinois were to adopt such a policy, police officers
relying on the smell of marijuana in probable cause determinations
would quickly be deterred from that behavior as the evidence
obtained in their searches would become inadmissible.425 Thus,
requiring corroborating evidence of criminal behavior would refocus
the police force’s time and money towards violent offenders, just as
the state of Illinois intended.

V. CONCLUSION
Illinois’ current policy arises out of the history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding expectations of privacy in
the vehicle context. It reflects an extension of the plain view
doctrine to find that the odor of marijuana places the illegal
contraband in front of the officer, just as seeing a bag of marijuana
would. This reasoning no longer applies after legalization. Further,
Illinois’ policy is based on an underlying assumption that officers
are capable of detecting the smell of marijuana as easily as an
officer can identify it by sight. While courts throughout the United
States are holding that the smell of marijuana can still establish
probable cause for a vehicle search even after decriminalization or
legalization, their justification fails to reflect the intent and goals of
deprioritizing marijuana. As Massachusetts correctly reasoned,
decriminalization and legalization reflect legislative intent and
voter desire that police officers spend their resources searching for
evidence of violent offenses.
When Illinois decriminalized marijuana, the intent was
similarly aimed to refocus resources away from adults possessing
small amounts of marijuana intended for personal use. Legalization
went even further, with the State of Illinois setting a bold example
for how a state can draft legislation to both increase tax revenue
and decrease racial disparity associated with marijuana
prohibition. Unfortunately, the admirable goals of the state’s
legislators have been frustrated by Illinois courts adopting a policy
that the smell of marijuana is still indicative of a crime and still
sufficient to establish probable cause. It is time for the Illinois
Supreme Court to definitively answer the question it left open in
People v. Hill and hold that the smell of marijuana can no longer
establish probable cause without additional facts suggesting
criminal behavior. Illinois’ people and legislature have spoken, but
their economic and social goals are out of reach until Illinois courts
change their position and deprioritize policing of marijuana
possession as legalization intended.

425. See discussion supra note 35.

